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For centuries, the Indian Subcontinent has played a role as a crossroads of East and West 
and as a geopolitical kingmaker, encouraging trade but also representing the wealthiest region 
ever to be conquered.  In the 21st Century, the emerging global power of China has rapidly 
increased their aid and investment in South Asia, forging stronger economic ties with past 
partners and upending decades of alliances with other powers.  This thesis focuses on the 
motivations, decisions, and outcomes of Chinese financial flows into South Asia, analyzing the 
degree that Chinese investment matches governmental claims of motive and how the geopolitical 
landscape is changing in response to Chinese money.  Split into four sections, the thesis first 
provides justification for focus on the importance of South Asia and the unique nature of Chinese 
aid and investment, particularly with respect to China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative.  Next, the 
thesis overviews past literature on motivations, decisions, and outcomes of Chinese investment, 
providing background to qualitative changes and the tests run in this thesis. Thirdly, the thesis 
runs quantitative regressions and tests to provide greater clarity to the motivations behind 
Chinese investment.  The final chapters examine case studies of the two largest recipients of 
Chinese investment, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and explore how the investment patterns and 
political outcomes of these two countries are reflected across many recipients of Chinese money, 
and how these outcomes have called into question the success of the One Belt, One Road 
Initiative.  This research relies on data collected by AidData at the College of William & Mary 
and the goal of this thesis is to call into question the state of literature and the differing narratives 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
 1.1 – The Importance of South Asia and the Indian Ocean 
South Asia, comprising the countries of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, The 
Maldives, Nepal, and Pakistan, has historically been a major crossroads of the East and the West, 
as the European and Mediterranean powers and Chinese empires were roughly equidistant from 
the wealth of India.  Although control of parts of South Asia rarely fell into the hands of the 
strongest powers of either region in antiquity, both South Asia and China became battlegrounds 
of competition for imperial European powers during the Industrial Revolution.  However, India 
was far more influenced and affected by European rule, with its share of the world economy 
decreasing from 25% to 2% in just two centuries, though both regions’ prominence on the world 
stage was diminished in the wake of European industrialization.1  India was called the jewel of 
the British empire for a reason, as extracting resources and goods from India greatly increased 
the wealth and prosperity of the United Kingdom. 
Unlike India, China was never dominated by a single European power and the Qing 
Dynasty maintained a significant degree of independence from European rule, though still had 
their manufacturing industries set back a century when faced with European competition.  
However, also unlike South Asia, post-1949 China and its long-term planning from a stable 
communist government, Maoist and post-Maoist reforms, and imposed cultural standards have 
propelled the Chinese economy to a position particularly enviable to India and other South Asian 
nations.  Given the past benefits to wielding commanding influence in different regions of the 
 
1 David Clingingsmith and Jeffrey Williamson, "Mughal Decline, Climate Change, and Britain's Industrial Ascent: 
An Integrated Perspective on India's 18th and 19th Century Deindustrialization," National Bureau of Economic 
Research, November 2005, 17, doi:10.3386/w11730. 
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world, especially historically South Asia, China’s economic rise has correlated with an increase 
in foreign investment, exports to nearby nations, and military spending.  In this way, Chinese 
investment in Southeast Asia going back to the 1980s and more recently South Asia and the 
Indian Ocean region exhibits characteristics of both Big Stick Diplomacy and neocolonialism.2  
Chinese investment, especially in gaining access to the Indian Ocean region, has treated 
investment in Myanmar geographically and infrastructurally as China has treated other South 
Asian nations, even though Myanmar is culturally Southeast Asian.  As Myanmar was also ruled 
by the British Raj and exhibits Chinese investment patterns more similar to its Indian Ocean 
neighbors than Chinese investment in South China Sea countries, Myanmar is added to the 
countries of South Asia in the analysis of Chinese investment in the region in this thesis. 
 In the years following the fall of the Soviet Union, China has developed educational 
standards, industries, human capital, and urbanization in a bid to be a dominant regional power, 
bordering on global superpower.  India and South Asia, which once were developmentally ahead 
of China in the Mao era, have fallen behind though their economies are still growing rapidly.  
The United States remains the strongest counter to China, but China doesn’t have to compete 
long-term with a country with less than a third of China’s population and an ocean away.  China 
has already militarily and economically surpassed and dwarfed its neighbor and past rival Japan 
and only sees major long-term competition from one nation: India.  Unlike China, which has 
preserved the majority of its past empires’ historical territories, Precolonial Indian empires have 
been fragmented again and again, currently split up into major countries of India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, and even Afghanistan.  These four countries are now known for adversarial 
 
2 Takeshi Shiraishi, "The Rise of China and its Implications for East Asia," in Sinicization and the Rise of China: 
Civilizational Processes Beyond East and West, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (London: Routledge, 2013), 139. 
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relations, religious extremism, and often dysfunctional or incompetent governments, failing to 
preserve any kind of unified force of political power.  Thus China, if not offered the opportunity 
to persuade its long-term rival of India to favorable deals, has a variety of other options in the 
region to gain access to resources and infrastructure in the region outside of the crown jewel, 
while simultaneously placing pressure on its rival. 
 The Indian Ocean region currently hosts the largest population not capitalized in the 
current market at the “bottom of the pyramid,” as it provides access to the poor of highly densely 
populated South Asia, the rural and disconnected peoples of parts of Southeast Asia, and to the 
populous and extremely poor regions of East Africa.3  As these regions and populations come 
into their own economic development, they will demand infrastructure, goods, services, and a 
variety of other things developed nations can export.  This makes the Indian Ocean the most 
geoeconomically strategic region of the world in the upcoming decades.  It’s also a region 
without a strong regional power, as Indian military power is focused on relationships with 
neighboring Pakistan and China, Indian economic strength is primarily devoted to domestic 
concerns, and Indian has not dominated the import market of neighboring countries.4  In contrast, 
Chinese power extends well beyond its corner of East Asia and is the largest trading partner with 
nearly every country in East and Southeast Asia.5  For these reasons, alongside declining 
American comparative advantage in military, economic, and diplomatic measures in the Indian 
Ocean region, China sees an opportunity with a wide range of benefits in establishing itself as 
both benefactor to developing nations and the primary beneficiary of their strategic and trade 
 
3 Catherine Dolan, "The new face of development: The ‘bottom of the pyramid’ entrepreneurs," Anthropology 
Today 28, no. 4 (August 2012): 1, doi:10.1111/j.1467-8322.2012.00883.x. 
4 DataBlog, "India's trade: full list of exports, imports and partner countries," The Guardian, February 22, 2013, xx, 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/feb/22/cameron-india-trade-exports-imports-partners. 
5 Statistics Database, Trade Profiles, (Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization, 2017), 
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFHome.aspx?Language=E. 
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benefits.  Once again, control of South Asia and the Indian Ocean may determine the economic 
and military primacy of a new power for the next century, as it has done for Great Britain and 
Portugal in the past. 
 1.2 – The One Belt, One Road Initiative 
 China has been investing in parts of South Asia since each of the countries of the region 
became independent.  However, China hasn’t had a particularly friendly relationship with post-
independence India due to India’s granting of asylum to the Dalai Lama in 1957 and claiming of 
territory in the Himalayas that China regards as its own, which led to the 1962 Sino-Indian war.6  
Chinese investment projects in the region have included the Karakoram Highway in Pakistan, 
which came online in 1969, and a similar infrastructural project in Myanmar in the 1980s and 
1990s.7  However, Chinese investment has rapidly increased in the 21st century, dwarfing all 
previous investments to countries in South Asia.  This led to Chinese State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) attempting to acquire ports in Pakistan in 2000, ports in Sri Lanka in 2010, increased 
investments in infrastructure development in Myanmar in the 2000s, and a renewed focus on 
highways and railroads connecting China to hubs in Nepal and Bangladesh.8  This investment 
gradually ramped up until 2013, when China proposed a multitrillion dollar multilateral 
investment project spanning the majority of Afro-Eurasia which they called the “One Belt, One 
Road Initiative.”  This has become to be known in the English world as the Belt and Road 
 
6 Jagannath P. Panda, India and China in Asia: Between Equilibrium and Equations (London: Routledge, 
2019), 131. 
7 John W. Garver, "China's Rise and the Eurasian Transportation Problem," in China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative 
and South Asia: A Political Economic Analysis of its Purposes, Perils, and Promise, ed. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard 
(Basingstoke, UK: Springer, 2018), PDF e-book, 48. 
8 Ibid., 48. 
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Initiative (BRI).  Xi Jinping announced the BRI in 2013 in Kazakhstan with this translated 
statement on improving economic ties throughout Asia: 
In order to make the economic ties closer, mutual cooperation deeper and space of 
development broader between the Eurasian countries, we can innovate the mode of cooperation 
and jointly build the "Silk Road Economic Belt" step by step to gradually form overall regional 
cooperation. First, to strengthen policy communication. Countries in the region can communicate 
with each other on economic development strategies, and make plans and measures for regional 
cooperation through consultations. Second, to improve road connectivity. To open up the 
transportation channel from the Pacific to the Baltic Sea and to gradually form a transportation 
network that connects East Asia, West Asia, and South Asia. Third, to promote trade facilitation. 
All the parties should discuss the issues concerning trade and investment facilitation and make 
appropriate arrangements. Fourth, to enhance monetary circulation. All the parties should promote 
the realization of exchange and settlement of local currency, increase the ability to fend off 
financial risks and make the region more economically competitive in the world. Fifth, to 
strengthen people-to-people exchanges. All the parties should strengthen the friendly exchanges 
between their peoples to promote understanding and friendship with each other.9 
This announcement of the BRI became an increasingly bigger project and viewed as 
more important than an announcement in Kazakhstan might belie as Chinese investment project 
in ambitious trade and investment deals, infrastructure plans, monetary flows, and cultural 
exchanges became more frequent, more robust, and gained more funding.  This led the BRI to 
eventually be viewed as a multilateral challenge to the post-Soviet European and America-
centric unipolar global economic order.  However, in its initial proposal, the BRI is an incredibly 
ambitious investment and development project. 
 
9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road 
Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries. Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 
2013. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686/t1076334.shtml. 
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 The Belt and Road Initiative is likely the most ambitious network of investment projects 
ever proposed, and China likes to refer to it as the “Chinese Marshall Plan,” drawing a favorable 
contrast to the very successful and multilaterally empowering investment plan that the United 
States used to rebuild postwar Europe in the 1950s and 1960s.10  However, unlike the Marshall 
Plan, the BRI uses medium and high interest rate loans rather than grants of money, and the 
Marshall Plan’s success rested largely on the prewar infrastructure and domestic institutions that 
were build up in the developed societies of Western Europe, whereas the BRI seeks to invest 
heavily in developing nations.   
 There are two main components to the BRI; namely, they are the Silk Road Economic 
Belt (SREB) and the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI).  The SREB covers the overland 
roads and pathways China desires to develop to provide infrastructural highways to valuable 
resources, profitable markets, and strategic ports.  The SREB system additionally has a variety of 
sub-corridors which China has highlighted as of heightened interest, including the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor (BCIM), 
the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor (CRM), the China-Central Asia-Western Asia 
Economic Corridor (CCAWA), the New Eurasian Land Bridge (NELB), and the Indochina 
Peninsula Economic Corridor (IPEC).11  Investment projects along the SREB are frequently 
based in infrastructure projects connecting these corridors back to China, oftentimes in the form 
of railroads, highways, or petroleum pipelines.  Additionally, more regional infrastructure 
projects designed to boost the electricity production in a host nation or improve its accessibility 
 
10 Yang Minghong, "Understanding the One Belt One Road Initiative: China's Perspective," in China’s One Belt 
One Road: Initiative, Challenges and Prospects, ed. Bal K. Sharma and Nivedita D. Kundu (Delhi: Vij Books India 
Pvt, 2016), 10. 
11 Srikanth Kondapalli, "The Maritime Silk Road and China–Maldives Relations," in China’s Maritime Silk Road 
Initiative and South Asia: A Political Economic Analysis of its Purposes, Perils, and Promise, ed. Jean-Marc F. 
Blanchard (Basingstoke: Springer, 2017), PDF e-Book, 174. 
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to internet are common, though if these projects are undertaken near the Chinese border, it can be 
likely that the benefits are transferred back to China.12  Overall, the SREB is the network of 
overland infrastructure and development initiatives marketed in a way to benefit all of Asia, 
though often looks more like a hub in China with spokes extending outward rather than 
establishing non-Chinese pathways and connections.13 
 The Maritime Silk Road Initiative comprises the waterborne part of the BRI, focusing on 
developing overseas trade routes and infrastructure such as ports, sometimes building off 
overland connections of the SREB.14  China has expressed interest in having the MSRI be 
especially connective throughout South and Southeast Asia, but also stretch into the 
Mediterranean via the Suez Canal, down the coast of East Africa, and out to South Pacific 
Islands.15  Thus far, the MSRI has led to a high density of investment projects in unlikely places, 
like Sri Lanka, The Maldives, Bangladesh, far west Pakistan, and Djibouti, a variety of places 
that have little socially or economically in common, no long history of alignment with China, 
and no consistent similarities in market benefit.  Add in other more regular partners of China 
such as Myanmar, Malaysia, and Tanzania, and a pattern of investment in areas with valuable 
deep water port capabilities emerges, though maintains far greater density in the countries 
directly bordering India.16  Unlike the SREB, the MSRI has far less basis in inland projects and 
 
12 Bertil Linter and Chiang Mai, "Poor and Isolated, Myanmar Backs into a China Debt Trap," Asia Times, January 
31, 2019, https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/01/article/poor-and-isolated-myanmar-backs-into-a-china-debt-trap/. 
13 Thomas S. Eder, "China Creates a Global Infrastructure Network," Mercator Institute for China Studies, last 
modified June 7, 2018, https://www.merics.org/en/bri-tracker/interactive-map. 
14 Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, "China’s Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative and South Asia: Political 
and Economic Contours, Challenges, and Conundrums," in China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative and South Asia: A 
Political Economic Analysis of its Purposes, Perils, and Promise, ed. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard (Basingstoke, UK: 
Springer, 2018), PDF e-book, 6. 
15 Ibid., 4. 
16 David Brewster, "The MSRI and the Evolving Naval Balance in the Indian Ocean," in China’s Maritime Silk 
Road Initiative and South Asia: A Political Economic Analysis of its Purposes, Perils, and Promise, ed. Jean-
Marc F. Blanchard (Basingstoke, UK: Springer, 2018), PDF e-book, 72. 
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penetration for certain countries, instead focusing on developing ports like Hambantota in Sri 
Lanka, now owned by China, Gwadar in Pakistan, whose profits go to China, Jiwani in Pakistan 
and Obock in Djibouti, now Chinese military bases, and Kyaukpyu and other nearby Burmese 
ports.17  Should the MSRI be profit-oriented, each of these countries now represents a substantial 
market for China to export its excess capacity in a mercantilist fashion via their large ports, 
which also function in certain cases as terminal points of SREB’s economic corridors.18  
However, the MSRI’s economic benefits and infrastructure benefits outside the vicinity of the 
port for host countries are far more nebulous than the benefits of the SREB. 
 To finance these initiatives and build up a greater degree of international cooperation in 
their investment projects throughout Asia, China started the financial institutions of the Silk 
Road Fund (SRF) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).19  The latter explicitly 
was designed as a Chinese alternative to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the joint United 
States-Japan investment bank that China accused of being heavily biased towards European, 
American and Japanese interests.20  The AIIB in particular has been generally lauded as an 
investment bank and a reputable international financial institution, attracting partner countries 
from all corners of the globe, though the SRF has been more in line with other state-owned 
Chinese programs.  However, investment projects financed by loans from China can have high 
non-concessional rates of interest, leading to increasingly unsustainable debt that countries can’t 
 
17 Ibid., 72. 
18 David J. Karl, "Sri Lanka, The Maritime Silk Road, And Sino-Indian Relations," in China’s Maritime Silk Road 
Initiative and South Asia: A Political Economic Analysis of its Purposes, Perils, and Promise, ed. Jean-Marc F. 
Blanchard (Basingstoke: Springer, 2017), PDF e-Book, 151. 
19 Blanchard, “China’s Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative and South Asia,” 5. 
20 Philippa Brant, "Why Australia Should Join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," Lowy Institute, September 
25, 2014, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-australia-should-join-asian-infrastructure-investment-
bank. 
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pay off – this has led to asset seizure by Chinese SOEs in certain occasions, most famously the 
Sri Lankan Hambantota port.21 
Investments along both the SREB and MSRI are mainly bilateral, between China and the 
host country, though occasionally are multilateral and have more diverse benefits.  However, due 
to a strong skew towards bilateralism, the BRI has faced accusations of subverting multilateral 
relationships to increase the influence Chinese money has over each country in the BRI.  Chinese 
SOEs have won a disproportionate amount of contracts in these investment initiatives, leading to 
accusations of bias and false pretense of fair play for all BRI participants.22  Similar concerns of 
hidden motives are frequently leveled at the MSRI and the SREB as ways for China to increase 
the security of their naval lines of communication and of their natural resource transit route.23  
For petroleum, this route stretches from the Persian Gulf to Shanghai, transiting through several 
choke points which could be used to threaten the Chinese supply, providing some motivation for 
Chinese oil pipelines under construction in Pakistan and Myanmar. 
The Belt and Road Initiative could have a variety of positive effects for nations involved 
in the project by meeting Asia’s growing demand for infrastructure, increasing efficiency in 
markets by international trade, and promoting development to lessen poverty in participant 
countries.  Unfortunately, these have not been the most prominent effects of Chinese investment 
in South Asia and the rest of the world affected by the BRI, as recipient countries have been 
seeing growing discontent with Chinese SOEs from both the populace and their governments, 
 
21 John Hurley, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance, Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road 
Initiative from a Policy Perspective, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2018), 
https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-
perspective.pdf. 
22 James Kynge, "Chinese Contractors Grab Lion's Share of Silk Road Projects," Financial Times, January 24, 2018, 
https://www.ft.com/content/76b1be0c-0113-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5. 
23 Blanchard, “China’s Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative and South Asia,” 10. 
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facing looming debt traps from high interest rate loans, and losing territory to Chinese claims and 
military aggression.  Although China may state that their goals are benign and seek to increase 
positive relations, bilateral economic gains, and engage in “win-win” diplomacy, recipient 
countries far more often end up in a worse place or having bought something different than what 
they were promised.  The BRI may not be what China initially claimed it to be. 
 1.3 – The Framework and Methodology of the Thesis 
 This thesis seeks to explain the reasons why China and its multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) have invested in a variety of locations in South Asia and to isolate which forces are at 
play in motivation of Chinese investment.  Using Paul and Benito’s Antecedents, Decisions, and 
Outcomes (ADO) framework of assessing why and how countries invest and the results of the 
outward foreign direct investment (OFDI), a full and balanced picture of the state of affairs in 
Chinese investment can be developed.24  This literature review allows for consideration of 
China’s history in altruistically giving aid or investment funds, with little to no benefit to 
Chinese companies or the government.  Secondly, examining the degree that Chinese investment 
tracks with explicitly profit-oriented MNEs is crucial to proving or disproving the most common 
form of investment worldwide.  Profit-oriented investment at a microeconomic level considers 
firm level data and evaluates whether or not Chinese investment in a country parallels traditional 
motivations for a business to invest in that particular place – usually tied to macroeconomic 
variables, regulations, or desire for market penetration.  Macroeconomic investment for 
maximizing China’s own Gross National Product (GNP) warrants evaluation in a planned 
economy like China, which would then evaluate the degree that export of excess capacity, export 
 
24 Justin Paul and Gabriel R. Benito, "A review of research on outward foreign direct investment from emerging 
countries, including China: what do we know, how do we know and where should we be heading?," Asia Pacific 
Business Review 24, no. 1 (2017): 92, doi:10.1080/13602381.2017.1357316. 
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of surplus labor, or desire for acquisition of scarce and strategic natural resources has on 
motivation of OFDI.  Lastly, evaluating Chinese investment’s similarity to domestic political and 
geopolitical investment strategies is critical to evaluating the degree that the BRI acts as a tool 
for multilateral economic development rather than an arm of Chinese geopolitical policy. 
 Secondly, evaluating how Chinese MNEs actually have invested and the outcome of 
those investments can shed light on the tools China is using to develop regions or infrastructure 
projects and the impacts on host countries’ citizens.  Using geospatial visuals of the locations 
where China has invested in South Asia and comparative figures and tables to discern any 
pattern of why China may be more invested in one region than another can be useful for 
understanding how China is currently investing in the region.  Similarly, evaluating the degree 
that China is a risk-averse or risk-loving investor allows us to account for whether their 
investment falls along the standard profit-oriented assumptions for multinational enterprises.  
Examining the outcomes of Chinese OFDI also can provide causality of continuation for certain 
actions if China finds that they benefit their country in some unknown way and also allows for 
examination of the fallout of BRI investment projects throughout South Asia.  Considering 
national or subnational political backlash, both in host countries and within China and other 
investing powers, allows for comparison of how Chinese BRI investment projects differ from 
other kinds of OFDI.  Similarly, political decisions by the governments of host countries 
following the influx of Chinese OFDI demonstrate tangible changes due to BRI investment 
projects and can provide greater motivation for OFDI to similar countries. 
 Following the ADO literature review, the thesis examines a variety of tests using panel 
data to evaluate if a variety of macroeconomic or geopolitical variables have any effect on total 
Chinese aid and investment or number of announced investment projects to South Asian 
                         12 
countries per year.  These allow for quantitative results to reinforce or refute aspects of the 
literature review and provide evidence for yearly or country bias by Chinese investment.  As 
these points are also geospatially distributed, the thesis analyzes their geospatial distribution and 
ensure that the investment projects when weighted by amount are not randomly dispersed but, 
instead, clustered due to some other variable.  The thesis also evaluate these points’ proximity to 
a variety of other variables, including resources, the Chinese border, and the ocean, providing 
evidence supporting or refuting claims of Chinese preference for bilateralism rather than 
multilateralism, the strategic importance of the MSRI compared with domestic economic 
development, and claims of asset-seeking behavior.  Simultaneously, the thesis evaluates the 
average per-project value per each country and evaluate allegations of Chinese geopolitical 
preference at a per-project level.  These tests provide quantitative results for Chinese investment 
patterns and can support or refute theories and past scholars’ findings, giving credence and 
independent thought to the conclusions. 
 The thesis wraps up statistical analyses and finishes with case studies examining China’s 
special relationships with Pakistan and Sri Lanka, both representing emblematic positions within 
the SREB and MSRI.  These are the countries China with which has forged the closest 
partnerships in the years prior to and immediately following the announcement of the BRI and 
China has positioned these two countries in economic and infrastructural positions amenable to 
Chinese interests.  However, China’s motivations and investment patterns in these countries are 
not extremely similar; instead, both represent the culmination of Chinese investment in their 
respective patterns and can be largely generalized to the ongoing situations in a variety of other 
nations.  Energy investment and highway and railroad infrastructural projects linking China with 
the host countries are far more common on the SREB, while port development and transportation 
                         13 
leading to the ocean dominate in the MSRI.  Domestic political responses are far sharper on the 
MSRI, in part due to the presence of more democratic systems responsive to fears of debt traps, 
but also due to lower perceived benefits for the citizens of the host countries and perceived 
greater geopolitical influence for China.  Using these case studies and applying the data of the 
literature review and quantitative analysis, multifaceted and well-supported conclusions with 
substantial evidence can be drawn regarding the motivations and impacts of Chinese investment.  
These conclusions include that Chinese investment in South Asia: is not purely profit-oriented 
and maintains a geostrategic aspect, is not petroleum-seeking, is biased towards Chinese borders 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review  
 
 2.1 – Antecedents to Chinese Aid and Investment 
 
One of the biggest concerns on the minds of China scholars questions Chinese 
motivations and intentions behind their massive aid and investment projects.  OFDI from China 
has greatly increased since 2004, becoming the second largest developing country in terms of 
OFDI, the first being Hong Kong, which itself is a special region of China.25  As of 2017, China 
had taken the 12th spot globally for most outward foreign direct investment (4th including Hong 
Kong), and they have achieved the position for most Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
and Other Official Flows (OOF), broadly categorized as aid.26  This rapid growth of both aid and 
investment has naturally led to questions and studies of their motivations for doing so.  This 
literature review continues previous studies of motivation for both the Chinese government and 
Chinese corporations exploring how and why China is investing, starting with the antecedent part 
of the ADO framework. 
There is little doubt in the minds of most OFDI scholars that OFDI is done with MNEs’ 
interest in mind, though the conversation is slightly different with respect to aid to foreign 
countries.  Chinese aid, unlike aid from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries, is significantly skewed toward OOF than ODA, meaning their 
loans are significantly more non-concessional and have less of grant and development 
 
25 Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig, "What determines Chinese outward FDI?," Journal of World Business 47, no. 1 
(2012): 27, doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2010.10.017. 
26 Central Intelligence Agency, "COUNTRY COMPARISON :: STOCK OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT - 
ABROAD," CIA World Factbook, last modified December 31, 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/rankorder/2199rank.html. 
    Axel Dreher et al., "Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset," 
AidData Working Paper #46 (2017): 2, Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary. 
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components than those classified as ODA by the OECD.27  Most Chinese aid projects are ODA, 
but OOF contributions far outweigh ODA based on measurement of contributions, particularly 
the large infrastructure projects China has frequently funded in recent years.28  The Chinese 
government has explicitly stated on several occasions that projects they have funded for 
development or infrastructure purposes are explicitly altruistic, including a new railway from 
Addis Ababa to Djibouti.29  Health aid to Africa has been frequently praised by both Chinese and 
African government officials as a “’no strings attached’ altruistic approach which ‘never imposes 
ideology, values and development models on other countries, especially African countries.’”30 
Some Chinese scholars have similarly emphasized that the BRI is explicitly designed with 
multilateral coordination in mind and that China’s benefit from investments in the BRI is not out 
of proportion when compared to other countries and their OFDI often has altruistic properties.31  
However, the altruism model is highly criticized by many quantitative-analytical scholars, as few 
investments even from the most transparent and ODA-giving donors cross a strong altruism 
threshold, peaking at 28% altruistic investments from the Netherlands.32  In light of models 
placing the countries with high amounts of grants and minimal diplomatic or personal economic 
benefit from their aid with an average of 10% of investments motivated by altruism, China, 
which infrequently uses grants in aid and is not transparent with their financial flows, is 
exceptionally unlikely to choose their aid or investment projects based on altruistic reasons. 
 
27 Ibid., 8. 
28 Ibid., 8. 
29 Jonathan Kaiman, "China says it built a railway in Africa out of altruism, but it's more strategic than that," Los 
Angeles Times, n.d., https://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-africa-ethiopia-20170804-htmlstory.html.  
30 Shuang Lin et al., "China’s health assistance to Africa: opportunism or altruism?," Globalization and Health 12, 
no. 1 (2016): 3, doi:10.1186/s12992-016-0217-1.  
31 Minghong, "Understanding the BRI: China's Perspective," in China’s One Belt One Road, 21. 
32Andrea Civelli, Andrew W. Horowitz, and Arilton Teixeira, "Is Foreign Aid Motivated by Altruism or Self-
Interest? A Theoretical Model and Empirical Test," SSRN Electronic Journal, June 2013, 30, 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2390448.  
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The simplest explanation for Chinese investment is that their firms are profit-oriented and 
seek out investments abroad for profit-oriented reasons.  Profit-oriented investments can be 
subdivided into efficiency-seeking, access to foreign markets, and natural resource and strategic 
asset acquisition.33  Multinational enterprises throughout the world are common and not just in 
China, though MNEs from China are frequently SOEs, which leads to perceptions that both 
SOEs and other Chinese MNEs are non-profit-oriented investors.34  However, many scholars’ 
research has supported the position that by-and-large Chinese MNE investments are profit-
oriented. 
 China’s economy is modernizing, which brings them into a position less complementary 
to the economy of the United States and developed economies such as Japan and the “Asian 
Tigers” but also weakens their comparative advantages to other developing countries.35  This 
puts them in a position where, due to “the intensification of international competition and the 
rising cost of resources and labor force, the original competitive advantage relying on labor in 
China has been greatly weakening.”36  Urban wage growth in China has been nearly 14% per 
year, leading to an average income increase by a factor of 6 from 2000 to 2014.37  
Comparatively, an MNE can hire five Ethiopians for the cost of one Chinese worker, cutting 
down significantly on wage costs.38  It may also be more efficient to move production to 
countries where regulations and institutions are weaker than those in China, looking for an exit 
 
33  John H. Dunning and Sarianna M. Lundan, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy (Gloucestershire: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008): 68. 
34 Peter J. Buckley et al., "The Determinants of Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment," Journal of 
International Business Studies 38, no. 4 (July 2007): 502, doi:10.1057/9780230248328_6.  
35 Audrye Wong, "China's Economic Statecraft Under Xi Jinping," Brookings, last modified January 25, 2019, 
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-economic-statecraft-under-xi-jinping/. 
36 Jiang Yu and Xinhua Jian, "Political-Economics Analysis of Chinese Economic Trends," World Review of 
Political Economy 8, no. 4 (Winter 2017): 460, doi:10.4324/9781315109459-2. 
37 Ibid., 465. 
38 Kaiman, “China says it built a railway.” 
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strategy from the home environment, as Zambia was able to attract Chinese investment via a 
weak regulatory framework and environmental standards.39  Additionally, Chinese OFDI has 
been correlated with weakening domestic environmental and regulatory standards due to the 
economic weight it brings, allowing Chinese MNEs to consider countries with flexible 
institutions.40  Some studies additionally imply that Chinese OFDI tends toward selection of 
countries high in corruption.41  Although a wide variety of studies have found OFDI from MNEs 
across the globe positively correlated with stronger institutions, the idea that Chinese OFDI is 
different has been empirically supported.42  Several studies have indicated that weaker 
institutions and more liberal economic policies are correlated with increased Chinese OFDI, 
though one specifically posits that weaker institutions are primarily correlated with an increase in 
natural resource-centric OFDI.43  While there is definitely discourse as to what degree Chinese 
MNEs seek low-cost land and labor and favorable regulatory conditions, there is a community 
that believes this to be the foremost cause of Chinese investment.   
 Another possibility within the realm of profit-oriented MNEs is the use of investment to 
gain access to foreign markets.  This is particularly important for China as they are in the midst 
of a crisis of excess capacity and excess labor supply, with consumption and exports both too 
 
39 Chengqi Wang et al., "What drives outward FDI of Chinese firms? Testing the explanatory power of three 
theoretical frameworks," International Business Review 21, no. 3 (2012): 429, doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2011.05.004. 
    Muhamad Mumtaz et al., "An Analysis of Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment in Emerging and 
Developing Countries: Implications for Pakistan under CPEC," The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic 
Studies 42, no. 3-4 (November 2017): 333, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321111155_An_Analysis_of_Chinese_Outward_Foreign_Direct_Investme
nt_in_Emerging_and_Developing_Countries_Implications_for_Pakistan_under_CPEC.  
40 Ibid., 358. 
41 Richard Bluhm et al., "Connective Financing: Chinese Infrastructure Projects and the Diffusion of Economic 
Activity in Developing Countries," AidData Working Paper #64 (2018): 22, Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William 
& Mary. 
42 Kolstad and Wiig, “What determines Chinese,” 28. 
43 Ibid., 33. 
    Buckley, “The Determinants of Chinese,” 513. 
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low to match production.  The expansion of quantity produced has become unsustainable as 
exports’ role in economic growth shrunk as foreign countries demanded less, leading to a crisis 
of excess capacity.44  Due to stratified income inequality and low proportion of labor income to 
national income, there is little room for growth in consumption in the Chinese economy, 
requiring greater penetration into foreign markets for exports.45  China also experiences a huge 
mismatch in need for investment, with some sectors heavily overinvested in and some 
underinvested in; the same problem is experienced in different regions, as the coastal areas are 
more technically developed but less efficient with allocation of resources.46  This is one of 
China’s major reasons for investing in oft underserved regions such as East Africa, an area due 
for an upcoming explosion in urban consumers and users of technology while China has less 
prospective growth in consumption.47  China also seeks to increase connectivity across 
developing regions by investing in a variety of transportation networks to bring more consumers 
to their market and expand the reach of their firms.48  Even aid to African nations can serve to 
open up new markets – as China forgave $3 billion in debt to African countries, those same 
countries signed $70 billion worth of service contracts.49  However, some scholars undercut the 
argument about alleged transfer of Chinese excess capacity and reject that the BRI and 
investment deals were made with exporting their production surplus in mind.50  Alongside 
growth in consumption of Chinese goods and services by the African continent, Chinese 
 
44 Yu and Jian, "Political-Economics Analysis," 460. 
45 Ibid., 461. 
46 Ibid., 472. 
    John Knight and Sai Ding, "Why Does China Invest so Much?," Asian Economic Papers 9, no. 3 (September 
2010): 107, doi:10.1162/ASEP_a_00030. 
47 Kaiman, “China says it built a railway.” 
48 Bluhm, "Connective Financing,” 9. 
49Yun Sun, "The Domestic Controversy over China's Foreign Aid and the Implications for Africa," Brookings, last 
modified July 29, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2015/10/08/the-domestic-controversy-over-
chinas-foreign-aid-and-the-implications-for-africa/.  
50 Minghong, “Understanding the One Belt,” 14. 
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investments, particularly those in infrastructure, are using imported Chinese labor as host 
countries’ labor forces rarely have enough skills to do technical work requiring years of training, 
thus providing an outlet to export Chinese labor.51  Market-seeking MNEs logically invest in 
larger markets, larger markets per capita, and growing markets where there are fewer powerful 
corporations serving niches, and data indicates that investment is positively correlated with size 
of market.52  However, there is data that suggests Chinese OFDI does not follow this established 
economic trend with market size among non-permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC), instead preferring smaller markets when dealing with Security Council 
members.53 
 Thirdly, among profit-oriented motives, Chinese MNEs and SOEs may be investing with 
the intent to acquire critical natural resources or assets strategic to either the company or nation.  
China is relatively scarce in many raw materials, especially in comparison to their labor force, 
resulting in massive import campaigns for resources fundamentally necessary for participation in 
the modern economy, namely iron ore and petroleum and gas products.54  For decades, Chinese 
OOF has been driven by loans to resource-rich countries, such as those in Africa, which granted 
China access to natural resources such as oil, timber, and nickel, fueling China’s economic 
boom.”55  As the price of many natural resources rose following the 2008 recession, many 
Chinese MNEs capitalized on internalization of the ownership of these resources to ensure that 
 
51 Mumtaz, "An Analysis of Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment,” 357. 
52 Buckley, “The Determinants of Chinese,” 512. 
    Kolstad and Wiig, “What determines Chinese,” 33. 
53 Hong Ma and Yue Teng, "How Political Incentives Affect Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment: A UN 
Security Council Membership Perspective," The World Economy 41, no. 12 (May 2018): 3424, 
doi:10.1111/twec.12677. 
54 Yu and Jian, "Political-Economics Analysis," 465. 
55 Kaiman, “China says it built a railway.” 
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production costs would be lower and not subject to price inflation or cartel-esque price hikes.56  
This correlation is most easily seen in Africa, as past studies have found investment in countries 
outside of Africa to be insignificant with respect to natural resources.57  Furthermore, correlation 
explicitly with Africa substantiates the claim that investment in countries with weak institutions 
has an interactive effect with investment in countries with large deposits of natural resources.58  
There may also be a temporal component as to when Chinese MNEs decide to pursue strategic 
assets and scarce natural resources, as studies have found that there was not an attempt to secure 
strategic economic positions prior to 2001, though nearly all scholars are in agreement that 
today, Chinese MNEs invest with components of seeking natural resources.59  Not only do 
Chinese MNEs pursue natural resources and strategic assets to shore up their position both 
domestically and in the global economy, the Chinese government encourages MNEs to invest 
OFDI in resource sectors which can secure natural resources to support Chinese economic 
growth.60  However, once again, Chinese investment in Security Council members rich in natural 
resources runs counter to economic intuition, implying greater political forces may motivate 
investment.61 
 Though undoubtedly there is good evidence for some economic motivation to OFDI from 
Chinese MNEs and aid from the Chinese government, there may be additional political goals 
affiliated with investment, attempting to consolidate domestic power via international support.  It 
is important to note that of the top 30 Chinese MNEs investing abroad, 28 of them are SOEs, 
 
56Yu and Jian, "Political-Economics Analysis," 465. 
57 Mumtaz, "An Analysis of Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment,” 356. 
58 Kolstad and Wiig, “What determines Chinese,” 33. 
59 Buckley, “The Determinants of Chinese,” 513. 
60 Wang, "What drives outward FDI,” 430. 
61 Ma and Teng, “How Political Incentives Affect,” 3424. 
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directly implying political or geopolitical motivation in investments.62  Some people are 
concerned that Chinese grants of aid to health programs in Africa are actually soft power to 
secure stable supplies of oil and minerals from the continent.63  A more direct example of 
Chinese political goals is up-front diplomatic loyalty expectations tied to aid regarding 
acknowledgement of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, Tibet, and the Uyghur people.64  These 
agreements are not exclusive to aid, as China has also been known to bribe individuals in corrupt 
governments in return for favorable agreements to Chinese ocean territory, as this scandal was 
brought to light in the Philippines in the mid-2000s and from Cambodia’s actions at a 2012 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting.65  Additionally, Chinese investment 
in countries bordering Tibet and Xinjiang may also be part of a domestic strategy to exert greater 
control over the region.  Xinjiang acts as a central lodestone for both the historical Silk Road as 
well as modern Chinese infrastructure investments moving through Central Asia, the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and connections moving north into Russia.66  Both 
Pakistan and Kazakhstan have experienced significant complaints about how China is treating 
their citizens and other Muslims, but China has shown no indication of stopping their Muslim 
“reeducation centers,” widely regarded as detention or concentration camps, possibly implying 
that this is the new status quo and part of their consolidation of power using the BRI.67  Tibet, 
which has more and more weakly resisted Chinese rule for decades, has a similar position linking 
China and central India via the China-India Economic Corridor and Trans-Himalayan Economic 
 
62 Kolstad and Wiig, “What determines Chinese,” 29. 
63 Lin, “China’s Health Assistance,” 3. 
64 Ibid., 3. 
65 Wong, "China's Economic Statecraft.” 
66 Mihir Sharma, "The Hole at the Heart of China’s Silk Road," Bloomberg, August 7, 2018, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-08-07/xinjiang-is-key-weakness-in-china-s-belt-and-road-plan. 
67 Ibid. 
                         22 
Zone of Cooperation, both involving trade with Nepal.68  The Chinese government has another 
important political reason to prioritize economic growth: as long as the economy grows at a 
steady and strong rate, they are far less likely to experience protests or calls for democracy.  
Ensuring a strong supply of natural resources and managing excess capacity is essential to 
pacifying the Chinese public and continuing the Communist Party’s chokehold on power.69  
However, aid to other developing countries is unpopular among domestic Chinese as China itself 
is a developing country.  Because the government is sending aid and investments to places 
significantly better off than regions of interior China, they leave a dilemma where China must 
send aid to receive favorable contracts to placate the populace who are miffed that China is 
sending aid.70 
 The final theory for motivation behind China’s unprecedented aid and investment 
campaign throughout the world is based on geostrategic reasons, those which give China a leg up 
in international political or economic situations.  In recent years, China has begun “to act like a 
great power which takes a role in international politics and security,” marking a significant 
change from greater concern with domestic affairs and regional security.71  This includes 
building a naval and military base in Djibouti, just eight miles from the only American military 
base in Africa.72  In conjunction with the building of the base, they have invested more money in 
Djibouti and Ethiopia, including for the construction of their supposedly altruistic railway.73  
Among members on the UN Security Council, we see several correlations that indicate non-
 
68 Tshering Chonzom Bhutia, "Tibet and China’s 'Belt and Road'," The Diplomat, August 30, 2016, 
https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/tibet-and-chinas-belt-and-road/. 
69 Buckley, “The Determinants of Chinese,” 504. 
70 Sun, "The Domestic Controversy over China's Foreign Aid.” 
71 Kaiman, “China says it built a railway.” 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
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profit-maximizing motive, including greater investment from China in countries with smaller 
markets, more conflict, fewer resources, and less rule of law. 74  This implies international 
political goals and to some degree provides evidence for vote-buying, as countries each represent 
one vote in the UN Security Council and it would be cheaper to buy the votes of smaller and less 
FDI-attracting countries.  Other studies have implied correlations between US aid and 
investment and votes in both the General Assembly and the Security Council, so it is not unlikely 
China would experience similar correlations.75  China has also begun testing its geopolitical 
power through use of coercion against South Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan, withholding imports 
and restricting tourism if those countries make decisions adverse to the Chinese Communist 
Party.76  With respect to investments, some scholars have alleged China has engaged in ‘debt-
trap diplomacy,’ lending high-interest rate predatory loans that would be very difficult for 
developing countries to pay off, leading to default.77  This resulted in Sri Lanka converting their 
debt into equity by handing Hambantota Port to a Chinese port company and calling for bids on 
the nearby airport.78  Cambodia also has a looming debt trap, as did Malaysia until their Prime 
Minister declared in 2017 that Malaysia would not pay the predatory loans that his predecessor 
accepted.79  Pakistan additionally represents an investment which could be considered a debt trap 
in several years while still bringing China significant geostrategic value.80  Arguments have been 
made that China’s forthcoming port in Gwadar and naval base in nearby Jiwani, Pakistan, at the 
terminuses of CPEC, is not only for the purpose of ensuring the safe passage of their oil through 
 
74 Ma and Teng, “How Political Incentives Affect,” 3424. 
75 Axel Dreher et al., "Does US Aid Buy UN General Assembly Votes? A Disaggregated Analysis." Public Choice 
136, no. 1-2 (July 2008): 160, doi:10.1007/s11127-008-9286-x. 
76 Wong, "China's Economic Statecraft.” 
77 Veasna Var and Sovinda Po, "Cambodia, Sri Lanka and the China debt trap," East Asia Forum (Canberra), March 
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78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
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the Strait of Hormuz, but also to exert control when necessary over other ships’ passage through 
the strait.  Given China’s network of infrastructure investments and building of military bases 
and ports, the theory that the BRI is designed to advance the Chinese geopolitical or geo-
economic position, or conversely undermine that of the United States or the European Union 
(EU), is reasonable. 
 These concepts of altruistic aid, profit-oriented investment, and aid and investment for 
political purposes outline the major theories for Chinese investment throughout the world.  
Profit-oriented investment can further be subdivided into desire to obtain cheaper labor or 
weaker regulations or institutions, access to foreign markets to transfer excess labor and excess 
capacity that China is producing, and strategic acquisitions of natural resources or other assets.  
Political motivations can similarly be subdivided into domestic political goals of the Chinese 
Communist Party and their geopolitical goals.  Having outlined the fields of thought on the 
antecedents of motivations of the Chinese’ heavy handed aid and investments throughout the 
world, the natural continuations are “What is the state of Chinese investment now?” and “What 
are the impacts of Chinese aid and investments?” 
 2.2 – Decisions of Chinese Aid and Investment 
 As the antecedents to investment leave a variety of questions to be answered, examining 
Chinese MNEs’ decisions in where they have thus far invested is the vital next step in evaluating 
the motivations behind where these investments go.  Rather than evaluating the motivations for 
investing in one way or another, the decisions part of the ADO framework allows for a 
methodology to understand how Chinese MNEs are currently investing and does not yet come to 
the effects of their investment.  This allows for questioning the purpose of investing in certain 
regions and their method of investment. 
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Firstly, “Where do Chinese MNEs invest?”  
FIGURE 1 
 
 Figure 1 depicts a map of investment by Chinese firms in South Asia from 2005 to 2014 
as compiled by AidData,81 a research lab housed at The College of William & Mary and 
displayed in ArcGIS.82  The amount of investment at a given location is represented by the size 
 
81 AidData Research and Evaluation Unit, 2017, Geocoding Methodology, Version 2.0, Williamsburg, VA: AidData 
at William & Mary, https://www.aiddata.org/publications/geocoding-methodology-version-2-0.   
    Bluhm et. al., “Connective Financing.” 
82 Maps throughout this thesis were created using ArcGIS® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the 
intellectual property of Esri and are used herein under license. Copyright © Esri. All rights reserved. For more 
information about Esri® software, please visit www.esri.com. 
ESRI (2019), ArcGIS and ArcMap Geographic Information Systems Software, Version 10.7.1, Environmental 
Systems Research Institute, http://www.esri.com. 
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of the bubble and displayed with linear increases in area.  Should the location of a project not be 
specified, the entry location of OFDI has been assumed as the capital of the host country and 
highlighted in yellow.  During this time, Chinese government agencies and Chinese MNEs 
(though often SOEs) gave aid and investments to a variety of South Asian countries, though with 
visibly outsized investment in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and debatably the Maldives, while investing 
relatively little in the largest market of South Asia, India.  Decisions to invest in OFDI are 
traditionally governed by 3 pressures: home regulatory pressure, host country regulatory 
pressure, and host country normative or cultural pressure.83  As all Chinese companies are 
governed by the home regulatory pressures, this restriction does not help differentiation between 
these three countries to determine if market oriented pressure pushes Chinese MNEs and federal 
agencies to aid and invest in Pakistan and Sri Lanka.  Thus, of these three pressures, the one both 
easiest to compare and the most influential upon the method and choice of introduction to a new 
market for a Chinese MNE is host country regulatory pressure.84 Host country regulatory 
pressures could arise from legal restrictions on foreign direct investment in the host country, the 
host country government constraining foreign firms’ operations by instituting restrictive policies, 
or host country laws and regulations that discourage foreign firms from making equity-based 
market entries.85  This is a frequent concern with businesses hoping to go global, and an 
international “Ease of Doing Business Index” has been compiled by the World Bank for this 
purpose, which can be seen in Table 1.86
 
83 Lin Cui and Fuming Jiang, "State ownership effect on firms' FDI ownership decisions under institutional pressure: 
a study of Chinese outward-investing firms," Journal of International Business Studies 43, no. 3 (2012): 19, 
doi:10.1057/jibs.2012.1. 
84 Ibid., 19. 
85 Ibid., 42. 
86 World Bank, "Ease of Doing Business Score and Ease of Doing Business Ranking," Doing Business, last 
modified 2019, https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB19-
Chapters/DB19-Score-and-DBRankings.pdf. 
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TABLE 1 
 
 This clearly shows that Pakistan and Sri Lanka are not any easier to do business in than similar countries in the region, such as 
India and Bhutan.  Not a single category of the “ease of doing business” ranking comes up high within South Asia for both Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka.  This ensures that the finding that Chinese MNEs invest in countries without low-regulation advantages remains robust 

































India 77 1 7 2 1 6 1 1 3 2 5 5 
Bhutan 81 2 4 5 2 1 2 7 1 1 1 9 
Sri Lanka 100 3 3 4 3 4 6 4 5 4 6 4 
Nepal 110 4 5 7 4 2 3 5 7 3 3 3 
Pakistan 136 5 6 8 7 5 5 2 8 5 4 1 
Maldives 139 6 2 3 6 7 7 8 2 6 2 6 
Afghanistan 167 7 1 9 8 9 3 2 9 9 7 2 
Myanmar 171 8 9 1 5 3 9 9 4 7 8 8 
Bangladesh 176 9 8 6 9 8 8 6 6 8 9 7 
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There is also significant pressure on MNEs from investments in culturally different 
countries, particularly those that have different business customs, have social preference towards 
local businesses, or treat foreigners unequally to native citizens.87  Preference towards more 
culturally similar countries among profit-maximizing MNEs is reflective of the economic 
benefits of similar culture, and can be seen as a variable taken into consideration in profit-
maximizing investment decisions.  This requires a measurement of cultural distance to compare 
South Asian countries to China, which can be calculated using Kogut and Singh’s method for 
calculating cultural distance.88  Using previous delineations of major cultural differences by 
Geert Hofstede, Kogut and Singh compared and averaged deviations in Hofstede’s categories of 
uncertainty avoidance, individuality, tolerance of power distance, and masculinity-femininity.89  
When adapted to the 21st century and the examination of the case of China, Kogut and Singh’s 
model was tweaked to a “psychic distance” scaling from 1 at the very closest country culturally 
to the country under study, to 100, the most culturally different country to the country under 
examination.90  For all countries in South Asia with the exception of Bhutan and the Maldives, 
both of which have very low populations compared to all of the other countries under study, 
consult Figure 2 for their cultural distance from China.91 
As these cultural distances show, only Sri Lanka is relatively culturally similar to China, 
and still less so than Myanmar.  Afghanistan, India, and Bangladesh beat out Pakistan for 
 
87 Ibid., 43. 
88 Bruce Kogut and Harbir Singh, "The Effect of National Culture on the Choice of Entry Mode," Journal of 
International Business Studies 19, no. 3 (February 1988): 422, doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490394. 
89 Kogut and Singh, “The Effect of National Culture,” 422. 
    Kogut and Singh make it clear that they are reliant upon Hofstede’s indices.  For more detail on these indices, 
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    Geert Hofstede, Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values (Thousand Oaks: 
Sage Publications, 1980). 
90 Katarina Blomkvist and Rian Drogendijk, "The Impact of Psychic Distance on Chinese Outward Foreign Direct 
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91 Ibid., 682. 
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cultural similarity to China, with only Nepal coming in further culturally from its Himalayan 
neighbor.  Thus, cultural pressures in countries such as India are not pushing Chinese MNEs to 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka, indicating that something else is motivating their decisions to invest. 
FIGURE 2 
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 On Figure 3, it can be visually seen that there are two clear paths to investment in 
Pakistan: the more densely populated and developed eastern route and the smaller western route 
heavily reliant upon Chinese infrastructure.92 
FIGURE 3 
 
Both eastern and western routes through Pakistan are crucial to investment in CPEC, 
though they serve different purposes.  The eastern route, where all of the largest investment 
projects in Pakistan have been dedicated, runs from Islamabad through the densely populated 
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Punjab and Sindh provinces, ending up at the major port city of Karachi.93  The western route 
also starts in Islamabad, but takes a number of smaller grants for disaster relief and building 
human capital in the same region that China has announced plans to build a massive 
infrastructure project stretching to Gwadar and Jiwani in the far west.94  This western route 
notably bypasses the major population centers of the Pashtuns in the west in the area formerly 
known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the largest cities of Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), instead traversing a less populated but also less volatile region of 
Balochistan and of the western Punjab.95  From Islamabad, CPEC travels north through the 
extremely sparsely populated Gilgit-Baltistan and makes its way over the Hindu Kush into 
Xinjiang, the westernmost region of China.96  Although Chinese aid to Pakistan would be more 
correlated with population, and consequently consumers, than Chinese aid to India, the question 
of why would China invest in unpopulated regions of western and far northern Pakistan still 
remains. 
 When considering strategic behavior as a decision characteristic, several strategic 
behaviors have implications when choosing where to engage in OFDI.  Strategic fit, best defined 
as designing ownership structures to fit better with the local market, is critical in market-oriented 
OFDI, whereas strategic intent is more common with resource or asset-seeking or global-strategy 
oriented OFDI.97  Not entirely surprisingly, Chinese OFDI has historically been more oriented 
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towards strategic intent than strategic fit than MNEs from other countries.98  Investments by 
MNEs are usually either joint ventures with local corporations, often in the work of buying 
equity in another company, or buying full ownership of a subsidiary in another country; 
however, Chinese MNEs are significantly more likely to engage in wholly-owned subsidiaries 
than MNEs from other nations.99  Generally, as MNEs prioritizing strategic intent require “high 
levels of subsidiary control and intra-firm coordination,” Chinese MNEs prefer the wholly-
owned subsidiary approach to market entry when engaging in OFDI.100  Both asset-seeking and 
global strategy-oriented firms looking to invest will trend more towards wholly-owned 
subsidiaries over joint ventures out of necessity and efficiency of control.101  However, asset-
seeking MNEs and SOEs will trend less towards wholly-owned subsidiaries if they receive more 
Chinese governmental support, which could be tied to other countries’ concerns about Chinese 
control of their resources or to SOEs being more domestically oriented.102  Pursuit of wholly-
owned subsidiaries by Chinese MNEs as opposed to joint ventures predictably declines with the 
increase of host country regulations, cultural barriers, and restrictions by the Chinese 
government, the three categories which place greater pressure on MNEs.103 
 Chinese MNEs, in their pursuit of wholly-owned subsidiaries, do not differentiate much 
between greenfield wholly-owned investments and acquiring local businesses, though the latter 
happens more often.104  Both greenfield investments and acquisitions are profitable and preferred 
when China needs access to a market or to acquire a resource, though joint-venture greenfield 
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investments or acquisitions may be undertaken when a country has particularly cumbersome 
regulations or a large amount of risk is inherent in the deal.105  However, with the government’s 
backing, Chinese SOEs’ risk tolerance is higher at a statistically significant level, allowing them 
to engage in further wholly-owned subsidiary investments with strategic intent even while 
combated by domestic attempts to limit the influence of Chinese SOEs in key sectors.106 
 Thus, Chinese MNEs are relatively more risk-loving than other MNEs as they do not 
prioritize profit, also known as strategic fit, as often as they pursue strategic intent, either in the 
form of global strategy-orientation or in seeking control of natural resources.  The Chinese 
government’s aid to and Chinese MNEs’ investments in South Asia do not, at least visually, 
appear to be correlated with population, with gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at a 
subnational level, with poverty and need for development assistance, or with any altruistic or 
profit-oriented motive.  Their two most invested-in countries, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, share little 
in common economically and are outclassed by other countries in ease of doing business and 
cultural similarity to China, indicating that barriers in other countries are not driving Chinese 
MNEs to Pakistan and Sri Lanka.  This indicates that Chinese MNEs are investing in South Asia 
with some strategic intent, and, as elaborated upon in the antecedents section, this may be for the 
purpose of exporting excess labor and excess capacity, to acquire scarce and vital natural 
resources, for the purpose of consolidating power and achieving domestic political goals, or to 
further international geopolitical goals. 
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 2.2 – Outcomes of Chinese Aid and Investment 
 Although the outcomes of Chinese aid and investment directly affiliated with the Belt and 
Road Initiative are still in the early stages, we do have some indications of benefits to Chinese 
MNEs and other global results following investment.  A variety of correlations with outcomes of 
Chinese OFDI indicate MNEs are considering, or should consider, a wider array of benefits than 
those traditionally analyzed in response to OFDI.  Overall, outcomes have had a variety of 
effects on the domestic economy of China, on solving the issue of excess capacity, on rebellious 
minority groups, on orientation of OFDI of countries around the world, and on geopolitical 
relationships with a variety of powers. 
 Firstly, engaging in OFDI is correlated with an increase in total factor productivity within 
China.107  Total factor productivity (TFP) is the measurement of how productive a society is per 
person-hours worked, meaning that a country with high investment in capital and productivity-
increasing machinery will have higher TFP than a labor-centric economy with lower 
productivity.  TFP increases with respect to OFDI in a logarithmic way, so further increases in 
OFDI have decreasing marginal utility which would promote small and moderate amounts of 
investment internationally to maximize TFP improvement and resultant profit from minimum 
cost.108  This is hypothesized to be due to an increase in productivity by the MNEs investing 
internationally and resulting in productivity spillovers to other companies nearby their base in 
China, either due to an influx of new resources or due to a more competitive labor force.109  
Other scholars have affirmed a relationship between OFDI and TFP at the state level of China, 
 
107 Dierk Herzer, "The Long-run Relationship between Outward Foreign Direct Investment and Total Factor 
Productivity: Evidence for Developing Countries," Journal of Development Studies 47, no. 5 (May 2011): 783, 
doi:10.1080/00220388.2010.509790. 
108 Ibid., 783. 
109 Ibid., 778. 
  
                       35 
but have also examined these subfactors that contribute to TFP increase.110  Both inward FDI and 
outward FDI exploit the absorptive capacity of a society to shed productivity of international 
companies to the workforce, as they both contribute to innovation in a region.111  However, they 
also find that competitive intensity within China leads to a negative moderating influence against 
OFDI, partially due to the fear of loss of intellectual property in bringing their technology or 
patents back to China.112 
 China can also benefit from outward foreign direct investment through increasing their 
markets for exports.  Much like the mercantilist societies of Europe in the 1700s and many 
industrial capitalist superpowers since then, China is confronted with an issue of overproduction 
of goods and underconsumption of many of the goods they produce, especially when faced with 
a trade war and rising tariffs.113  One of the allegations leveled towards the BRI is that its 
primary purpose is sustaining the Chinese economy by seeking markets to consume the 
manufactured goods that the Chinese people cannot.  To some degree, this is true, as low and 
moderate levels of OFDI in countries participating in the BRI have yielded disproportionate 
increases in exports from China to these countries.114  This encourages these MNEs to diversify, 
producing products with comparative advantage in China and selling to their bilateral partners, 
and producing other items cheaper overseas and importing those back to China, reaping the 
rewards of both directions and greatly increasing Chinese exports.  However, there is also a 
statistically significant negative moderating impact upon exports correlated with the square of 
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OFDI.115  This implies that the ideal strategy for China to maximize exports to foreign countries 
would be to expand the breadth of the BRI, but not necessarily the depth in any one country.  
Tao et. al recommends that to improve the trade balance in favor of China, a more specific 
campaign of foreign direct investment is necessary, resulting in greater infrastructure 
investments through Central Asia to link European markets to Chinese goods, and exploiting the 
comparatively advantageous agricultural and labor resources of Southeast Asia and energy 
resources of Central Asia for reduction in production costs and the influx of just enough FDI to 
spike Chinese exports.116 
 Chinese aid and investment have also managed domestic political issues with minority 
groups in investments pre-BRI.  Nepal, in particular, has undergone major political changes in 
relative tandem with influxes of Chinese aid and investment in critical infrastructure systems.117  
As China has been recognized internationally as exhibiting neocolonial tendencies with regard to 
Tibet, Mongolia, Manchuria, and Xinjiang, the government of the PRC has sought to reframe 
their efforts as “the gift of development” to these relatively impoverished regions inhabited by 
ethnic minorities.118  This same “gift of development” has been given to Nepal to fuel energy and 
transportation infrastructure projects, jeopardizing Nepal’s historically close relationship with 
India and furthering Chinese interests.119  As Nepal is fully bordered on the north by the Tibetan 
Autonomous Region, Chinese investment in Nepal can most clearly be seen as an attempt to 
limit the freedom of movement of Tibetans over the previously porous border and strip the 
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Tibetan refugee community of South Asia of one of their most established cultural 
strongholds.120  Indeed, the “Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of China and Nepal 
draws a direct link between Chinese investment, infrastructure development, and the 
management of Tibetan populations in Nepal,” connecting “Nepal’s respect for Beijing’s One 
China policy and ideology of national unity [with] Beijing[‘s] commitment to infrastructure 
development and energy security in Nepal, particularly in border areas.”121  Additionally, as 
Nepal commits to Chinese goals regarding control of minority groups like Tibetans, they can 
count on a continued steady flow of Chinese investment, as both Chinese and Nepali newspapers 
advertise a train being built from Lhasa to the Nepali border on to Kathmandu, which would be 
another huge boon to trade between the two countries.122  Nepal’s experience as a recipient of 
Chinese aid and OFDI indicates that China can fulfill domestic political goals using OFDI, and 
may attempt to do so with Uyghurs by investing in Central Asia or with other groups. 
 Chinese foreign direct investment may also have an impact on the FDI of other countries, 
particularly the established channels of OFDI from developed countries that have existed for 
decades.  In 2003, countries in the Organization of Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD) made up about 90% of OFDI around the world, whereas China was responsible for 
roughly 1% of global OFDI.123  6 years later, the OECD proportion of world OFDI had dropped 
to roughly 79% whereas China’s share was closer to 5%  – a relatively dramatic shift reflecting a 
500% increase in their share of global OFDI in only 6 years and establishing a trend that has 
continued since.124  The outcome of a 10% increase in Chinese OFDI is correlated with a 3.4% 
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decrease in OECD investment, indicating that the OECD countries and their MNEs are 
competing for investment projects but not necessarily interested in competing for consumers and 
export markets, or at least in the regions that China has heavily invested in.125  This effect of 
crowding-out of investment of OECD countries is more concentrated throughout Asia and 
developed countries of the western world in Anglo-America and Europe.126  However, this 
crowding-out effect is not seen in Latin America or Africa, generally implying that Chinese 
OFDI does not preclude OECD countries from investing in resource-rich countries, though may 
successfully outcompete OECD countries’ outward foreign direct investment’s effects at 
providing an export market for domestic manufactured goods.127  Out of all of these regions, 
Chinese OFDI is most successful at outcompeting the OFDI of OECD countries within those 
same OECD countries and their neighbors in Anglo-America and Europe, likely because both 
Chinese manufacturing plants and manufactured exports from China are, without the 
consideration of subsidies, on average significantly cheaper than identical products made in the 
developed West.128  Displacing OFDI from traditional economic partners disrupts the flow of 
trade within the developed world and between the developed world and Asia, placing a moderate 
wedge between OECD countries and many of their traditional allies which could be further 
exploited for geopolitical advantage.   
 Chinese OFDI to nearby neighbors can provoke a multitude of emotions from 
governments and citizenry in those recipient nations.  Nepal’s government, as discussed before, 
was extremely amenable to the influx of Chinese aid and investment to grow their hydroelectric 
power, even if it was at the expense of the privileges that Tibetan refugees had enjoyed for over 
 
125 Ibid., 67. 
126 Ibid., 67. 
127 Ibid., 67. 
128 Ibid., 65. 
  
                       39 
half of a century.129  However, this joy was not shared by the Tibetan refugee community or the 
local Nepali Tamang people who lived in the region where China was directing the bulk of its 
hydroelectric investment package, both of whom often worried that China would attempt the 
same Sinicization they accomplished in Lhasa in the northern regions of Nepal.130  Furthermore, 
the influx of Chinese investment to a region without much wealth plunged the local economy 
into chaos, resulting in rampant alcoholism, prostitution, black marketeering, and skyrocketing 
housing prices, resulting in more and more Nepalis discontent with their government’s choice of 
a development partner.131  These concerns are not isolated to Nepal, and Nepal may be the tip of 
the iceberg.  Even attempts at Chinese investment may exacerbate ethnic tensions and reopen old 
sores of Ming or Qing Chinese imperialism, as is the case with anti-Chinese sentiments in 
Mongolia regarding Chinese ownership of mines.132  Similar concerns about Chinese “neo-
colonialism” regarding investments tied up with the BRI are present in Laos and Myanmar, 
enough so that the Burmese government cancelled a planned hydroelectric dam China was 
building.133  Although many Asian governments and citizenries are hesitant to accept any kind of 
substantial Chinese economic help due to past injustices, others see OFDI as the chance to turn a 
new leaf. 
 In contrast to renewed concerns of Chinese economic exploitation of historic neighbors 
like Mongolia, other countries see more of a pacifying effect associated with increases in FDI 
and overall economic ties.  When concerning countries with past adversarial dyadic 
relationships, an increase in bilateral trade and FDI reduces the probability of issuing a territorial 
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claim against the other.134  An increase in bilateral FDI between adversarial dyads causes a 
pacifying effect as there is greater opportunity cost for asserting territorial claims coupled with a 
declining benefit for territorial conquest in a world with increasing globalization and trade.135  
Another ramification of an increase in bilateral trade is an increase in bilateral communications, 
providing greater channels for diplomatic solutions to conflicts that may have flared up into 
military or violent conflicts had they occurred in prior periods with far lower bilateral FDI.136  
The effect of lower probability of asserted territorial claims is similarly seen with variables such 
as a history of military cooperation, increases in power disparity, and increases in economic 
openness, all of which have increased with China and its East and Southeast Asian partners in 
the past few decades.137  These trends indicate that Chinese increases in power disparity, greater 
economic investments throughout the region, and lower economic regulations preventing influx 
of foreign FDI may make challenging Chinese territorial claims more difficult for its regional 
partners.   
 However, whether China is or is not aggravating or appeasing its nearby neighbors in 
greater East Asia, China’s investments in the rest of the world have resulted in changes in 
alliances, voting patterns, and other critical aspects of the geopolitical balance of power.  A good 
example of an alliance change is the case of Cambodia.  China has backed six high-profile dam 
projects to bring Cambodia’s underdeveloped infrastructure up to speed with the rest of the 
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region.138  Additionally, simply acknowledging Chinese claims can net smaller countries 
potentially country-changing levels of investment, as most clearly seen by African countries who 
have been swayed by China’s large pocketbook in recent years to endorse the “One China” 
policy.139  China’s announcement for the biggest of Cambodia’s dam projects totaling a $600 
million investment was announced directly after Cambodia announced its support for the “One 
China” policy, paralleling previous lobbying efforts for recognition by African governments.140  
This investment in a Cambodian alliance paid off for them when Cambodia strongly supported 
China’s claim to the Spratly Islands when it was ASEAN chair, providing significantly more 
legitimacy to a previously very weak claim.141  As of 2019, China exerts near total control over 
the Spratly Islands by any power in the Southeast or East Asian region.   
Similarly, as discussed in the antecedents section, Chinese OFDI is significantly tied to 
temporary members of the UNSC.142  A temporary member of the UNSC can expect 59% more 
aid from the United States, 8% more aid from the United Nations (UN), and, in the 21st Century, 
more aid from China.143  This encourages countries to both vote more often with the investing 
power in response to aid and to vote more often with that power in order to attract more aid, 
similar to how Cambodia and certain African countries have affirmed their commitment to a 
“One China” policy soon before major investment deals are unveiled to the public of both 
countries.144  There is also statistically significant results regarding correlation of aid from China 
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in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and a decrease in voting similarity to the United States.145  
Both in the UNSC and the UNGA, an influx of Chinese aid or OFDI is correlated with either an 
increase in similarity to the position of China, an decrease in similarity to the position of the 
United States, or, more likely, a combination of the two.  However, given the increased amount 
of aid that a non-permanent member of a body like the UNSC receives compared to their voting 
power share of 0.2%, a country may not feel guilty lobbying to get a rotating position on the 
UNSC and selling their nearly useless votes to the USA or China in return for aid.146  Had the 
non-permanent countries had a voting share closer to 4% or 5%, where they could have 
legitimate impact and be the deciding vote on resolutions, they may be more independent.  Thus, 
the marginal benefit of selling votes for aid as compared to integrity in the case of a country with 
so little voting power makes sense whether China, the US, Russia, or anyone else offers a 
rotating member of the UNSC substantial aid. 
 To conclude the extended literature review, the literature regarding the outcomes of 
Chinese investment generally parallels the literature detailing the antecedents and decisions of 
Chinese OFDI.  There are some unique discoveries and correlations that were not emphasized in 
the study of the antecedents to Chinese investment, particularly those regarding the domestic 
economic developments in response to OFDI from the subnational regions of China, but 
generally they reflect the same ideas.  From this literature review examining why Chinese MNEs 
invest, how they invest, and the outcomes of their investment, there is a wide degree of overlap 
between these three interconnected aspects of investment, but also have provided focal points for 
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investigation in the hypothesis and testing sections of this thesis.  Relationships with countries 
like Nepal, Pakistan, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Mongolia have been identified as some of the 
most contentious or emblematic of the motivations and effects of Chinese investment, and, to 
best examine the impacts of China’s investment in South Asia, the thesis further considers case 
studies of Pakistan and Sri Lanka to detail the many ways China is reshaping South Asia 
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Chapter 3 – Hypotheses, Empirical Tests, Models, and Data 
 
 3.1 – Hypotheses, Data, and Methodology 
 From other scholars’ research expounded upon in the literature review, there are several 
that have already been sufficiently tested and been supported by statistically significant evidence 
or unsupported by evidence.  These include disproving the theory of altruistic investment (Civelli 
et al., 2013), indicating a significant negative correlation between voting alignment with the 
United States and Chinese aid (Xun and Shuai, 2018), providing evidence that Chinese firms are 
more risk-loving than global firms (Lin and Jiang, 2012), and preference for smaller and more 
chaotic markets (Ma and Teng, 2018).  Several of these studies provide significant evidence for 
non-profit maximizing models of investment, and others conclude that Chinese OFDI is driven 
towards vote buying at the United Nations.  However, with respect to South Asia, this thesis tests 
how China is investing, rather than proving what they aren’t doing.  These lead to a series of 
simple tests that can provide evidence for or against certain positions.  All hypotheses will be 
tested at the 5% significance level. 
 Hypothesis 1: Chinese investment is targeted and clustered in specific areas. 
 This test can be understood as an evaluation of the degree of clustering or dispersion a set 
of points experiences.  The test is known as Moran’s I and evaluates the degree which each point 
is away from a calculated mean point and multiplies each of these with a selected attribute – in 
this case the financial investment commitment to the project at that location.  This can test for 
money being geospatially weighted to be clustered or to be dispersed.  Moran’s I calculates a z-
score and a p-score which can be used to reject the null Hypothesis. 
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 Hypothesis 2: Chinese investment is not organized towards certain countries due to 
macroeconomic indicators such as population, GDP, or GDP per capita. 
 Hypothesis 3: Chinese investment is not oriented towards countries that vote with them 
more often at the United Nations General Assembly. 
 Hypothesis 2 considers any influence population, GDP, or GDP per capita may have on 
motivating the distribution of aid and investment from China to South Asia.  If investment is 
market-oriented, we would see population and GDP positively correlated with aid and 
investment per year due to profits that could be gained from greater market exposure.  Similarly, 
GDP per capita should be positively correlated with investment as there is usually greater 
disposable income and consumerism in countries with greater GDP per capita, encouraging 
investment and exports.  Hypothesis 3 tests for that, should geopolitical motives outweigh the 
importance of macroeconomic indicators, we would see a positive correlation between 
investment and alignment of UNGA voting between the host country and China or a negative 
correlation with alignment between the host country and the United States. 
 For these hypotheses, two tests will be run considering different explained variables, both 
grouped by country: one panel data regression on the total investment amount in a country in any 
given year accounting for fixed effects, and one panel data negative binomial regression on the 
number of projects in a country in any given year.  All large continuous variables, being 
investment, population, GDP, and GDP per capita, will be regressed as the log of their original 
value in both tests, alongside variables of agreement with China and the USA at the UNGA. 
Hypothesis 4: Chinese investment is not organized towards places with greater presence of 
natural resources. 
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 This test compares the proximity of each investment project to nearby natural resources, 
most notably petroleum.  Using ArcGIS’s Near tool, for every point of Chinese investment, the 
distance to the nearest member of another feature, in this case onshore or offshore oil reservoirs, 
can be generated.147  Thus, a correlation of the amount of investment at a point being negatively 
correlated with “Oil_Near” indicates that being closer to oilfields may motivate Chinese 
investment.  This can be evaluated by a regression on the negative impact of distance upon the 
explained variable, the log of the amount invested in a site.  All petroleum data is taken from 
Priogrid’s onshore and offshore petroleum datasets that are in or within 500 miles of a South 
Asian country.148 
Hypothesis 5: Chinese investment not organized towards places near China nor the ocean. 
 This test can be calculated with geospatial proximity Near measurements to China or the 
ocean and using those measurements as variables to explain investment at any given point.149  
Should they be negatively correlated, it would indicate that Chinese investment is significantly 
larger near the ocean or near Chinese borders.  A correlation like this would demonstrate China’s 
desire for infrastructure investments not specifically for the host country’s use, but also for 
China’s use in ports or in shipping goods and services overland near Chinese borders. 
Hypothesis 6: The average size of a project is the same across countries. 
 This test evaluates if host country plays a part in the average amount invested per project.  
It uses a simple regression with dummy variables for countries.  This correlation indicates desire 
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for critical alliances and geo-economic or geostrategic allies rather than investing uniformly 
within each country and per investment project. 
 3.2 – The Data and the Tests 
All of the aid and investment points derive from the AidData database from 2005-2014 
filtered for the countries of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, The Maldives, Myanmar, 
Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.150  However, there were no investments from China in Bhutan in 
this dataset, so Bhutan was not included in these analyses.  All monetary values committed were 
converted to US Dollars.  There were a number of data points which were earmarked for 
investment in a South Asian country but either had no monetary amount present in the data or 
had no location tied to a monetary amount – some points were missing both pieces of 
information.  For all commitments missing a monetary value, the data was supplemented using 
$1 as the commitment, and for all commitments that had no specified location, was provided a 
latitude and longitudinal point within the capital, as traditionally foreign investment goes to or 
transits through the receiving country’s capital.  Other than these situations, if ever China 
committed a large umbrella amount to a number of projects and AidData had coded the umbrella 
amount to each project, the commitment was divided evenly among the projects.  With this 
cleaned data, analysis became possible. 
Geographically, within South Asia, all maps for subnational level are drawn from the 
Global Administrative Areas database (GADM).151  For all of the countries under analysis, their 
administrative level 2 areas were used (henceforth shortened to admin 2, admin 3, etc.).  Admin 
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2 boundaries can mean different levels of jurisdiction in different countries, but can usually be 
best thought of as a sub-state or province level of organization underneath the admin 0 of the 
federal government and the admin 1 level of the state/province; the admin 2 level for the United 
States is the county (or rarely parish/borough).  This does lead to different sizes and populations 
for admin 2 levels across countries, though comparing different admin levels for each country 
would prevent a standardized methodology.  The Maldives did not have any subnational 
organization of government, so they have been excluded from subnational analyses. 
Hypothesis 1: 
 For hypothesis 1, the cleaned AidData points were evaluated in ArcGIS using the 
geoprocessing tool Spatial Autocorrelation (Global Moran's I). 152  The map evaluated is shown 
in Figure 1, displaying every location of Chinese aid and investment in South Asia from 2005-
2014 sized by amount invested, with the un-located variables shown in yellow.  Running 
Moran’s I on this map with the value committed to the project as the input field, a report (Figure 
4) is produced strongly rejecting the null hypothesis.  This shows a p-value significant at the 
.01% level, far higher a level of significance than set at 5%.  This test firmly rejects theorized 
non-clustered Chinese investment and similarly, rejects the null hypothesis for hypothesis 1.  The 
amount of dollars per location is not randomly distributed across South Asia and, thus, is 
clustered.  This in and of itself is not necessarily surprising, as it may be correlated with 
macroeconomic or other market-driven indicators, but also may be concentrated in one country 
or another, or imply some other geopolitical motive of investment. 
 
 
152 ESRI, ArcGIS and ArcMap. 
  










                       50 




                       51 
Figure 5 details a fixed effects panel data regression run in Stata153 of the log of the total 
Chinese aid and investment per year against the logs of macroeconomic indicators154 and voting 
similarity scores from the UN General Assembly.155  It also evaluates the impact each year had 
on the amount of investment per project; a similar control of fixed effects was run for individual 
countries, but in this model collinearity rendered the impact of countries omitted or extremely 
insignificant.   
The results of the panel data regression indicate a lack of any sort of significance of 
population, GDP, or GDP per capita on the total investment.  Similarly, agreement with China or 
the United States does not indicate at a level of significance correlation with total amount 
invested in a given per country per year, nor does any given year appear to have significant 
impact on the amount given to any given country.  However, although there are no statistically 
significant correlations of macroeconomic data to the amount invested in any given country, that 
itself may be a worthwhile conclusion.  A market-seeking or profit-maximizing MNE will seek 
out markets with high population, high GDP, and high GDP per capita which allow it to seek 
high numbers of customers with larger amounts of disposable income.  However, this regression 
indicates that Chinese investment projects are not market-seeking in the classical sense, meaning 
that we can not reject the null hypothesis for hypothesis 2 regarding the amount of market-
seeking and profit-oriented investment.  Due to weak and insignificant results regarding 
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alignment with China or non-alignment with the United States, we also cannot reject the null 
hypothesis for hypothesis 3 as regards investment. 
However, there still is the negative binomial panel data regression to consider.  In Figure 
6, a negative binomial panel data regression was run that took into account effects of individual 
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 For reference, Afghanistan here is represented as the base level of individual effects, but 
would be represented as AFG.  Bangladesh is represented as BGD, India as IND, Sri Lanka as 
LKA, The Maldives as MDV, Myanmar as MMR, Nepal as NPL, and Pakistan as PAK, which 
will be used throughout the data section for certain graphs and regressions that display the effect 
of individual countries. From this regression, the only significant correlation appears to be that 
an increase in the number of Chinese investment projects is correlated with an increase in voting 
similarity with the United States at the UNGA, which is exactly the opposite of what intuitively 
makes sense and other scholars have found in the literature.  However, because this value is also 
near-significant with voting similarity with China at the UNGA and China and the United States 
are the least similar countries when agreeing at the UNGA, this may imply that there is not 
meaningful variation in voting alignment with China and the United States at the UNGA.156  
Other than that, all variables are similarly insignificant with results that are parallel to the fixed-
effects panel data regression used for total investment of each country per year.  Similarly, they 
reinforce the idea that Chinese investment is not significantly profit-oriented or market-seeking, 
as the effects of population, GDP, and GDP per capita are all insignificant on motivating a 
number of Chinese projects.  The null hypothesis for hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected, and though 
there is significant data regarding alignment with the United States, as this refutes all of the 
literature regarding Chinese and American voting patterns at the UNGA, this result alone can not 
reject the null hypothesis for hypothesis 3.  However, consider Figure 7,157 which shows a graph 
of year-to-year alignment of each country by US and China.  The general trend these countries 
show moves together towards or away from alignment with these powers and is not associated 
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with increases in Chinese aid and investment.  These results imply that there is not meaningful 
variation in the voting alignment scores over this time period and alignment does not vary with 
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Hypothesis 4, Hypothesis 5, and Hypothesis 6: 
 Both hypothesis 4 and hypothesis 5 deal with nearness measurements to other variables, 
and have been included in the same regression, which also removes any confounding influence 
they may have had on each other.  Examine Figure 8.  The Maldives has been omitted due to 
negative collinearity with the other countries as is necessary when accounting for country fixed 
effects, becoming the reference point of comparison for all other countries in this model.  




 Consider hypothesis 4, which hypothesized that Chinese investment was not significantly 
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reject the null hypothesis, as the data indicates that Chinese investment is explicitly oriented 
toward areas further from known oilfields.  At a highly significant level, an increase in Chinese 
investment is correlated with an increase in distance from an oilfield, reaffirming the null 
hypothesis.  This indicates Chinese investment in South Asia is not resource seeking. 
 Regarding hypothesis 5, which sought to refute a connection between proximity to China 
or the ocean and increased investment, both distance from China and distance from the ocean are 
strongly negatively correlated with increases in investment.  This result indicates that China’s 
investment projects are significantly better funded if near China’s borders or the ocean, and thus 
means that the null hypothesis for hypothesis 5 is thoroughly rejected.  Investments in regions 
near Chinese borders indicate motivation for infrastructure and better transportation within their 
country, consolidating power over their western region of Xinjiang near Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, Tibet near Nepal, and Yunnan near Myanmar.  Similar desires may be held in 
investments near water, as China has built up several ports in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, 
the Maldives, and Myanmar, desiring geopolitical positioning in the Indian Ocean region or 
consolidation of control over their trade routes throughout the ocean. 
 Lastly, hypothesis 6 is refuted by significant correlations between higher values in 
investment when compared to different countries.  Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Nepal all have 
negative correlations between their amount of investment and their country, and Sri Lanka has an 
extremely positive correlation between the amount of investment in any given project and their 
country.  This result rejects the null hypothesis and indicates China has significant interests in Sri 
Lanka while their projects in Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Nepal receive lower funding, either 
because China is not funding as ambitious of projects or because they otherwise do not see 
investments in those countries as paying off to the same degree of Sri Lankan investments.   
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 3.3 – Implications of Lack of Data 
Much of the data in this project is incomplete, relies on past years, or is subject to some 
skepticism on its credibility.  China, in particular, does not release its investment data in the 
aggregate, and instead the go-to authoritative source on Chinese aid and investment is AidData’s 
Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset.158  Compared to western sources like investment and 
development funds from OECD nations, Chinese economic data is difficult to find and becoming 
more difficult, evidenced by that AidData’s dataset only runs until 2014.159  However, we also 
see a beginning of a gradual backsliding of Chinese economic data transparency under the HRV 
index, an index measuring transparency developed by Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland, 
scholars who postulated in 2018 that missing data is still a kind of data from which we can infer 
certain information about the regime.160  Their index does not account for years after 2010, but 
even before then we can see many of the countries of in this study backsliding in economic 
transparency (China, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal).161 
Transparency of countries can often be compared to credible international organizations 
such as the World Bank or the OECD.162  As transparency in data publication is correlated with 
increases in investment and economic development, competition in transparency to motivate FDI 
logically arises as an economic strategy.163  However, there are still many countries with low 
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measures of transparency that do not act in a profit-seeking or developmental motive of 
transparency.164  This is often due to concerns about backlash from certain data that may be 
released, threatening the entrenched powers in the society.  Taking the case of China, had they 
publicized each and every project that a branch of the Chinese government was funding, 
providing aid to, or a Chinese MNE or SOE was undertaking in another part of the world, there 
may have been greater investment in Chinese-theorized projects within the BRI.  Instead, China 
has had their companies exert near monopolies over bidding on BRI-funded projects, resulting in 
noncompetitive contracts and higher costs for the products they produce.165 
AidData did an amazing job at aggregating all of these Chinese aid and investment 
projects, but there have been more recent transactions catalogued by other groups.  The China 
Global Investment Tracker has catalogued Chinese investment and construction deals from 2005 
to 2018, but has covered fewer investment projects than AidData’s database and has not been 
able to gather enough data to geocode the different transactions, instead continuing at admin 
level 0, or that of a country.166  Similar issues arise with databases hosted by the Mercator 
Institute for China Studies and the Council on Foreign Relations.  In contrast, OECD countries 
release all of this data on their public and private aid and investment, indicating that China views 
the freedom of information of their investment practices as a substantial threat to their regime.167  
The difficulty in acquiring the data of Chinese investment itself is a datapoint in transparency 
concerns as well as concerns of motivations, decisions, and desired outcomes of the investment. 
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Chapter 4 – Pakistan: A Case Study 
 
 4.1 – A History of Pakistani Alignment 
 Talat Farooq’s book, US-Pakistan Relations: Pakistan’s Strategic Choices in the 1990s, 
was extremely helpful in researching the alignment of Pakistan during the Cold War and 
Pakistan’s growing ties with China, and much of this section can be found in greater detail in his 
work.  As the United States and the Soviet Union entered into a Cold War and cultivated a 
network of alliances, the United States initially pursued a strategic relationship with India but, 
due to India’s embrace of non-alignment and close relations with the Soviet Union, a close 
bilateral relationship was precluded.168  In lieu of an alliance with India, Pakistan provided a 
viable alternative due to its land border with China, proximity to Central Asian Soviet Socialist 
Republics, and a willingness to cooperate with the West.169  Pakistan’s establishment as a nation 
was uniquely threatened by India as West Pakistan (now Pakistan) and East Pakistan (now 
Bangladesh) were separated by one thousand miles of Indian territory and Pakistan suffered 
defeats as two states, Junagadh and Hyderabad, that had chosen to join Pakistan were claimed or 
occupied by India.170  Pakistan ignited a war over the concern that the third and only remaining 
Muslim-majority state, Kashmir, would go to India as well, gaining some territory but losing the 
majority of the Kashmiri population and cementing a military rivalry between India and Pakistan 
that would flare up periodically throughout the 20th century.171 
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Pakistan additionally faced an unfriendly threat from its west: Afghanistan, the only 
country to vote against its admission to the United Nations.172  Afghanistan, even more so than 
India, had close ties to the Soviet Union and was a frequent recipient of Soviet military aid, and 
exerted its alliance with a global superpower to refuse to recognize the Durand line delineating 
the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan which divided the Pashtun people and prevented a 
Pashtun controlling majority in either nation.173  Sandwiched between two hostile nations on the 
western half and nearly fully surrounded by an existential threat on the eastern portion, Pakistan 
needed strong allies, and only the US served effectively in this situation.  However, Pakistan’s 
concern about Indian power superseded any loyalty to the United States, quickly shifting to 
doing business with China when the USA imposed arms embargoes on Pakistan in response to 
Indo-Pakistan wars.174  Pakistan capitalized on China’s fellow rivalry with India, especially 
following the 1962 Sino-Indian war in which the US provided India with military aid and China 
claimed part of the Kashmir region now known as Aksai Chin.175 
 Pakistani ties to the United States waxed and waned throughout the rest of the 20 th 
century, as the US tentatively supported Pakistan in the 1971 Indo-Pak War for Bangladeshi 
independence but cultivated close ties with Pakistan and its intelligence service to secretly funnel 
money to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan to counter Soviet military aggression.176  As American 
relations with the Chinese Communist Party thawed following the Sino-Soviet split initiated 
during Nixon’s presidency, Pakistan’s use to the USA became more dependent on the threat 
posed by the USSR and US policy of containment of communism.177  Reagan’s administration 
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cooperated extensively with the Pakistani government regarding Afghanistan, but later American 
administrations from the late 1980s up until 2001 had little interest in Pakistan after the fall of 
the Soviet Union as an unaligned India was far greater an economic and strategic prize than 
1990s Pakistan was.178  Without an allied “big brother” and American rebukes of their nuclear 
program, Pakistan pursued closer military ties and weapons purchases from China and funded 
the takeover of Afghanistan by the pro-Pakistan Taliban.179  Following the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th, 2001, American interest in both Afghanistan and Pakistan quickly resurfaced, 
but not regarding Pakistan as a counterweight – on the contrary, the USA was actively working 
against Pakistani allies and promoting Afghan governments critical of Pakistan and further 
developing the Afghanistan-India nexus.180  As Pakistani and American interests gradually 
shifted from being generally aligned to being generally in opposition, Pakistan has found China a 
veritable partner to fill that gap, as both China and Pakistan have expressed strategic concern 
about India, their mutual longstanding rival whose geopolitical interests have moved closer to the 
United States’.181 
 As Pakistan seeks to ensure India does not become a regional hegemon in South Asia, 
challenging India’s territorial claims and developing nuclear weapons with Chinese help in 
response to the Indian nuclear program, a 21st century alliance with China makes increasing 
sense, especially if the United States and western powers’ interests align with those of India.182  
China has long valued connectivity across Xinjiang and Tibet, though was relatively 
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unsuccessful in western infrastructure projects; however, the exception to this rule is the 
Kashgar-Pakistan highway crossing the Karakoram Mountains, which became navigable by 
truck in 1969.183  As early as 2000, China expressed interest in developing Pakistan’s western 
port of Gwadar and connecting western Balochistan by rail and road to the rest of Pakistan, an 
endeavor expected to double the throughput capacity of Pakistan.184  However, due to American 
pressure on Pakistan, which was stronger in 2000 than any time since as American influence has 
waned due to diverging interests of the two nations, the operation and development of this port 
was transferred to the Singapore Port Authority.185  This led to little action taken on Gwadar’s 
development until a Chinese SOE reassumed control of the project in 2013.186  However, while 
desired development of a port was stymied by American interests in the 2000s, China established 
a free trade deal with Pakistan in 2007, doubling their bilateral trade volume in five years, though 
the benefits skewed in favor of China.187 
 Although there has gradually been a shifting of alliances in South Asia, most clearly 
reorienting Pakistan from alignment with the United States towards alignment with China, this 
movement has accelerated rapidly in the 2010s.  As bilateral trade volumes bloomed, so too did 
China’s ambitions in Pakistan, most clearly illustrated by the changes in policy and signaling 
from the Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang regime.  Shortly following both of their inaugurations in 
2012 and 2013, respectfully, Keqiang visited Pakistan just before Pakistan’s new administration 
took power and “agreed to develop an ‘economic corridor,’” followed by Prime Minister Nawaz 
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Sharif of Pakistan signing an agreement in Beijing for the development of a long-term plan for a 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.188  Although there was resistance to the investment deal by 
Pakistani political parties in opposition, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Pakistan in April 
2015 to formally break ground for the launching of CPEC, immediately starting work on 
expanding the Karakoram highway.189  The shifting of alignment with American interests 
towards those of China was functionally complete in both the political and social realms, as “in 
2014, 78 percent of Pakistanis held a favorable opinion of China, compared to just 14 percent 
having a similar view of the USA,” ensuring popular as well as political support for China’s 
goals in CPEC.190 
 4.2 – What is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor? 
 Arif Rafiq’s report for the US Institute for Peace was instrumental in providing detail, 
context, and analysis of motives and effects of CPEC for this section of the thesis.  Chinese and 
Pakistani officials state that the ambition of CPEC is to strengthen economic growth within 
Pakistan and the western Chinese region of Xinjiang, strengthening trade between the Arabian 
Sea and western China by moving through Pakistan.191  There are many mutual benefits for 
China and Pakistan in a massive investment endeavor as CPEC is shaping up to be, but the 
majority of these benefits are not necessarily of mutual interest to both nations, favoring one or 
the other.  CPEC itself has been primarily driven by Chinese interests, but Pakistan has found 
ways to satisfy a variety of its domestic goals for geostrategic, economic, and infrastructural 
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improvements.  For reference, consider the routes portrayed in the map of CPEC given in Figure 
9 detailing the present and forthcoming highways affiliated with CPEC.192 
FIGURE 9 
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 Pakistan’s economic interest in CPEC is the clearest, especially as the growth of 
Pakistan’s economy has lagged behind that of other countries in the region, excepting war-torn 
Afghanistan.193  In the wake of terrorist attacks and Taliban-derived unrest in post-9/11 Pakistan, 
FDI from western countries has slowed, resulting in a concentrated effort to attract new sources 
of FDI and aid.194  This effort is especially concentrated toward powers rich in capital like China, 
who can bring their expertise and technology to bolster, modernize, and diversify key industries, 
especially as Pakistan has labelled their agricultural and manufacturing sectors as targeted areas 
of growth from CPEC.195  Additionally, the crucial western line of CPEC runs through the 
poorest and least economically developed region of Pakistan, Balochistan.  Balochistan is 
sparsely populated and has a strong anti-Pakistan movement sometimes classified as an 
insurgency, and by using Chinese investments to grow Balochistan’s economy, Pakistan hopes to 
quell Balochi concerns that they are being left behind as the rest of Pakistan shows greater 
economic growth.196  Pursuing a partnership with China for economic modernization and 
development appears beneficial for Pakistan’s economic growth, industrial modernization, and 
especially the development and consolidation of central authority over a particularly restive 
region. 
 Infrastructurally, Pakistan leaves much to be desired, especially in their undeveloped 
western and northern regions of Balochistan, KPK, and Gilgit-Baltistan, though the other 
provinces have issues with very high demand on infrastructure systems not designed to support 
large Pakistani populations.  For both the undeveloped western and northern states and the 
populous economic and political centers of Sindh and Punjab, the upgrades to road and rail 
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infrastructure CPEC promises could be a godsend to crumbling roads and railroads leftover from 
the British era.197  For Gilgit-Baltistan, updating the precarious Karakoram highway to its 
projected 300% expansion would likely limit the current shutdowns due to landslides could even 
open up regions of the province that are isolated during the winter months, dramatically 
changing the lifestyle and accessibility of the region.198   
One of the perpetual issues of most countries in South Asia is rolling blackouts and 
power surges, which continue to plague Pakistan and are a serious hinderance to economic 
growth, part of why most countries try to control them to rural areas that require less power.  A 
large portion of CPEC and China’s investments in Pakistan specifically are designed to address 
the $4 billion shortfall in investment in energy infrastructure.199  Over 60% of the proposed 
spending of Chinese FDI in Pakistan from 2015 to 2020 is dedicated to generating and 
distributing electric power, prioritizing what many politicians and investors in both nations have 
highlighted as the critical issue of Pakistan.200  Pakistan has stated that it desires to pursue a more 
diverse energy fuel system to meet residential and industrial demand, though the majority of 
investments in energy sources have been oriented towards coal, which is not currently one of the 
leading sources of energy in the country.201  Additionally, Chinese investment in Pakistani ports, 
especially that of Gwadar, opens up a range of opportunities for Pakistan for trade that they’ve 
never had access to before.  With an economically viable major port less than 500 miles from the 
oil-rich desert metropolises of the Persian Gulf, Pakistan is dramatically transformed as an actual 
player in geo-economics in the region, becoming a critical location for imports and exports to 
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Central Asia, South Asia, and Western China – a position of trade connecting overland and 
maritime Pakistan has never experienced.202  Lastly, through the investments made by CPEC, 
Pakistan hopes to reignite interest from foreign powers that may have been scared off due to 
security concerns; a successful CPEC could convince investors that Pakistan is once again a safe 
location for investment.203 
Pakistan does have strategic reasons for partnering with China as well.  Through Gwadar, 
Pakistan seeks an outlet for both maritime trade and naval operations far away from the Indian 
border, as their current ports of Karachi and Port Qasim are both vulnerable to an Indian naval 
blockade.204  This vulnerability was exploited to great effect by the Indian Navy in a blockade 
during the 1971 Indo-Pak War, and a repeat of this incident – which rendered their navy useless 
and their trade severely impaired – is explicitly what Pakistan seeks to avoid.  This strategic 
partnership with China also is what enables the economic investment – Pakistan would not be 
getting this amount of FDI and loans for infrastructure and economic development had they not 
also embraced China’s strategic naval and geo-economic interests.205  Pakistan states many of 
these desires in their explanation for why they have wholly and completely embraced this 
massive Chinese investment project, though their government is under little misconception that 
Chinese interests in Pakistan differ from their own. 
Chinese interests in Pakistan are twofold: economic and strategic.  Investing in Pakistani 
infrastructure for them is a strategic matter, consolidating the power of the Pakistani government, 
and by extension their own influence, over ungoverned regions and securing their supply chain 
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through Balochistan, KPK, and Gilgit-Baltistan.206  Economically, China has struggled in the 
post-Great Recession era with a moderately slowing economy, in part due to their prodigious 
manufacturing industry that relies heavily upon exports to both the global north and to 
developing countries.207  Much of China’s interest in CPEC and other BRI trade deals derives 
from a need to continually seek out new markets to export to, again reflecting a mercantilist style 
of investment and mercantilism-driven needs of exporting its excess capacity and supply.208  
Aside from simply bolstering China’s overall economic growth, they also need to increase the 
profits of struggling Chinese SOEs by exporting their excess capacity, and Pakistan provides an 
alluring market of over 200 million consumers.209  Chinese investment in infrastructure in Gilgit-
Baltistan and northern regions of Pakistan provides a convenient reason to increase infrastructure 
investment in Xinjiang, growing accessibility and economic opportunity to the region, especially 
with direct access to the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea.210  Investment throughout Xinjiang and 
Central Asia allows for greater integration and projection of Chinese economic power westward 
through Asia, providing access to China in even more new markets and, for Central Asian 
nations, a new trading outlet to the sea via Xinjiang and Pakistan.211  On another note, many 
Chinese yuan are currently invested in US Treasury bills whose returns-on-investment have not 
risen in years, do not provide short-term profit, and have relatively low rates of return.  Directing 
new forex investments towards projects with higher rates of return and high interest rates on 
loans to developing countries like Pakistan is more profitable for both the Chinese government 
and SOEs.212  Additionally, China is an importer of a large number of agricultural products and 
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hopes to advance its own food security in the wake of minimizing trade with the United States by 
importing agricultural and livestock products.213  Pakistan makes for a good partner for this 
agricultural endeavor due to their large agricultural sector and fertile river valleys which produce 
most of the foodstuffs.  Lastly, a powerful and ostensibly Chinese base in Pakistan provides a 
stronger foothold in the Indian Ocean for access to other markets in the Indian Ocean region, and 
shows to other countries that may be interested in Chinese FDI or loans that there is a Chinese 
model of, theoretically, “win-win” international development that may work better than the 
western model.214 
For all the economic gains China and its SOEs can extract from Pakistan, their strategic 
benefits may be far greater.  However, first they must ensure Pakistan is a strategic investment; 
their first order of business has been reducing “the risk of violence in the Xinjiang region from 
Pakistan-based drivers of instability.”215  Historically, Pakistani mujahideen and other Islamist 
organizations that thrive in certain rural regions of Pakistan have not been amenable to Chinese 
infrastructure projects or any Chinese influence, some individuals going as far to promote radical 
Islamism and separatism among the Uyghur population in China.216  As China has attempted to 
force Muslims and ethnically Turkic peoples in Xinjiang into “reeducation camps” under the 
guise of combating terrorism in the region, they have also established firm bilateral commitments 
to combating terrorism from Pakistan for the safety of Chinese workers in both countries of 
CPEC.217  Similar concerns about terrorist attacks by Balochi separatists on Gwadar and routes 
of CPEC through Balochistan have been assuaged by commitments to policing, though attacks 
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have thus far still happened.  Stabilizing Pakistan and Pakistan-related terrorism that threatens 
Chinese interests maintains its priority in China-Pakistan relations, though China may understand 
that they cannot quash all radicalism or threats within Pakistan, as evidenced by CPEC’s 
avoidance of traversing the majority of KPK.218 
A major platform of security in CPEC for China derives from the strategic location and 
naval capabilities of Gwadar and Jiwani.219  Alongside the Chinese naval base in Djibouti, their 
upcoming base in Jiwani definitively establishes China as not a regional naval power, but a 
global naval power operating a blue-water two-ocean navy and taking a strategic position just 
next to the choke point of the Strait of Hormuz.220  In the Chinese plan, Gwadar will operate as 
the economic hub for commercial shipping, fueling the majority of Chinese desire for the 
Pakistan-Xinjiang trade route, while the small city of Jiwani, 37 miles from Gwadar, will 
function as their base for naval and military interests.221  In both locations, China establishes a 
break out from under US containment efforts, a goal that has come under greater focus as they 
consolidate their claim over the entire South China Sea with naval power.222  However, even if 
the Chinese government is not threatened by US naval controls, they would still be beholden to 
Indonesia and Malaysia, as currently the vast majority of their oil passes through the Straits of 
Malacca and neither of these Southeast Asian countries is partial to agreement with Chinese 
maritime claims.223  By constructing CPEC alongside an oil pipeline with a large port terminus 
for processing cargo, China can lighten the load of all goods, but especially petroleum, that are 
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threatened by hostile Malaysian or Indonesian forces and avoids further exacerbating the South 
China Sea disputes.224  Instead of shipping oil from the Persian Gulf, through the Straits of 
Malacca, and to terminus at Shanghai, Chinese ships can instead make the quick journey 
between Dubai (or other gulf cities) and Gwadar, pumping oil via pipeline through Pakistan, 
Xinjiang, and into central and eastern China.  Similarly, mineral and natural resource extraction 
from East Africa can end at the much closer terminus of Gwadar and be shipped via CPEC to 
Kashgar.225 
Gwadar greatly expands the capabilities of the Chinese military and of infrastructure and 
economic growth in western Pakistan.  The CPEC overall has significant strategic and economic 
implications for both countries, and it is not difficult to see why this exceptionally large foreign 
investment program is attractive to a developing country like Pakistan.  However, FDI is not an 
altruistic endeavor, and China obviously has their own strategic and economic objectives from 
such a heavy investment in Pakistan.  This section, in delving into what the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor is, examined the motivations driving both China and Pakistan to come 
together in a powerful economic partnership, and needs answers regarding the outcomes of 
Chinese investment in Pakistan. 
 4.3 – Outcomes of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
 Pakistan has had positive and negative results from their investment projects regarding 
CPEC.  Major issues involve protests and lack of popular support for certain parts of CPEC, 
unsustainability of the investment leading to growing debt, and promised accomplishments of 
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CPEC falling short of the end result.  These effects have tempered some of the support for 
Chinese investment and CPEC, putting Pakistan in a position of uncertainty. 
 As mentioned in the purposes for Pakistan pursuing CPEC, integrating Balochistan in the 
national economy and promoting development in the most economically backward province is of 
foremost concern for the central government, though this is opposed by Balochi separatists.226  
These separatists have been attacking Pakistanis from a variety of other regions for a number of 
years, but their attacks on Chinese workers have ramped up in recent years, attacking Chinese 
engineers and trucks carrying equipment to a Chinese mining project.227  This concern is not 
limited to Balochis though, as a number of Pashtuns and political parties with strength in KPK 
oppose certain investments and plans affiliates with CPEC.  This concern is primarily in 
response to a belief that the western Gwadar-Kashgar route will circumvent KPK areas directing 
economic and infrastructural investments to the already developed Punjab and Sindh.228  Xi 
Jinping’s visit to Pakistan was initially delayed from 2014 to 2015 due to protests from the 
national Pashtun political party, Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), which took 
control of the parliament in 2018.229  These protests largely arose as the majority of the earliest 
construction projects and investments affiliated with CPEC were concentrated in the Punjab, in 
part due to China’s security concerns with KPK and Balochistan but also due to decisions of the 
2015 ruling party, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), whose base of support resides in 
Punjab.230  However, even if the highway advancements follow the original route, KPK does not 
stand to benefit that much, because, examining Figure 9, the route barely crosses into southern 
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KPK and provides near no infrastructure benefit to the former FATA, avoiding the most densely 
populated Pashtun areas in favor of an easier route through the western Punjab.231  As a 
counterpoint, northern KPK may benefit more from the infrastructure investments of the 
Karakoram Highway, but concerns of both Baluchistan and KPK are powerful voices in the 
desire for autonomy and fairness that they see threatened by CPEC, in part propelling Imran 
Khan, a former critic of CPEC, to the Prime Ministership.  
 The most frequent concern levelled over CPEC is the growth in debt for countries that 
have accepted Chinese loans and plans to finance massive investment projects.  Examine Figure 
10, detailing the immediate marginal impact of the BRI lending pipeline.232  This section, and all 
subsequent sections dealing with the possibility of a debt crisis in a country touched by Chinese 
investment, draws from the previous research undertaken by Hurley et al. with the Center for 
Global Development.  However, pertaining specifically to Pakistan, qualitative research on the 
investment effects in Pakistan can also be attributed in large part to James Pershing, who works 
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FIGURE 10 
 
 As of March 2018, out of the 68 countries affiliated with the BRI, 23 of them face risks 
of debt distress, but of these countries only 8 face dire risks specifically because of the BRI.233  
These 23 countries are plotted on this graph, and the 8 countries facing BRI-related risks are 
highlighted in red.  Of these 8 countries, Pakistan stands to move clearly from being not aligned 
with China, which owned relatively little of Pakistan’s debt, to China having a nearly controlling 
majority of Pakistan’s debt.234  Compared to Pakistan’s debt to China prior to utilizing the BRI 
lending pipeline for CPEC investments, the BRI loans alone are over 6 times as much as the pre-
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CPEC debt to China.235  Even more concerning for Pakistan, the interest rates on the loans are 
not the 2% concessional rate given to Chinese Export-Import bank customers, but instead are 
closer to 5%, exacerbating the default risks.236  Unsurprisingly, Pakistan has had to seek a 
thirteenth International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout primarily as a result of these CPEC 
investments, imposing austerity measures to receive rescue funds that most directly target CPEC 
projects.237  This has led to near a 60% spending cut in CPEC projects – indicating that “both the 
IMF and Prime Minister Khan recognize that without serious reforms in Chinese lending 
practices and Pakistan’s own economy, CPEC may do more harm than good.”238  In financing 
CPEC, Pakistan’s current account deficit has grown nearly sevenfold just since the 
announcement of the initiative alongside a doubling of the external debt holdings.239  Perhaps 
most damningly, Standard & Poor’s has downgraded Pakistan’s long-term credit rating from a B 
to a B-, indicating that they have less confidence in Pakistan’s ability to repay the debt it takes 
on, particularly in reference to the BRI projects.240  Overall, the macroeconomic position of 
Pakistan is significantly more reliant upon China than it was pre-CPEC, and Pakistan has not 
incurred the growth promised by CPEC investments. 
 The projects of CPEC themselves have often been less successful than advertised, 
overpriced, or simply cancelled.  In 2014, Nawaz Sharif promised that CPEC’s energy 
investments would generate 17,000 megawatts of electricity annually, meeting the shortfall in 
demand; however, estimates in 2017 projected that electricity production would be roughly half 
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of Sharif’s claim.241  Pakistan still experiences shortfalls of 7,000 MW, even with the 
infrastructure investments affiliated with CPEC, failing to close the gap and taking on 
substantially more debt.242  The energy produced by Chinese countries funded by CPEC 
investments also is not price efficient, as it costs roughly 40% more per megawatt than energy 
from similar powerplants.243  These similar powerplants, such as the one at Jamshoro, are funded 
by the US- and Japan-led Asian Development Bank (ADB) which, unlike the CPEC contracts, 
required a competitive bidding process and resulted in a market-derived equilibrium price, far 
lower for the consumer and avoiding monopolistic supply.244  Similarly, Gwadar has struggled to 
attract the volume of shipping that it anticipated, falling far short of its goals and subsequently 
leading to far lower profits from the port for both Pakistan and China.245  Even if Gwadar had 
attracted a large volume of trade, Pakistan would not stand to benefit very much as it ceded 91% 
of all profits, though now currently meagre, to China for the next 40 years.246  Furthermore, 
CPEC has not contributed much to fixing the unemployment issues and the 1.5 million jobs a 
year necessary to accommodate Pakistan’s youth bulge.  Instead, only 75,000 jobs have been 
created in the wake of $20 billion in investments, falling far short of the 10 million jobs that the 
PTI claimed CPEC would create.247  A variety of projects also have been cancelled, including 
many energy products in the midst of the shortfall – which the PTI government appears to claim 
does not exist and that sufficient energy is available to meet demand.248  On China’s end, they 
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Karakoram Highway, all of which happen to be in KPK and Baluchistan.249  A number of 
projects have not provided the results desired or been overpriced, leading to other projects being 
cancelled and initiating a cycle of degrading likelihood of a project’s completion – significantly 
compounded by the IMF austerity-derived 60% cut to CPEC funding from the Pakistani 
government. 
 China may also be hesitating on their commitment to CPEC, seeing a number of warning 
signs and cancellations that indicate that CPEC and reliance upon Pakistan is a bad investment.  
More recent estimates of overland shipments via CPEC road network and the Karakoram 
highway from Gwadar could take up to twice as long as seaborne shipments of goods to 
Shanghai and cost up to sixteen times as much – although an oil pipeline may still be strategic 
and profitable.250  As mentioned before, several projects China had signed on to build have been 
cancelled, and the Pakistani austerity measures cutting their investment into CPEC is another 
source of worry for the Chinese.251  China’s concerns regarding Pakistan have not been assuaged 
by their seeking of IMF assistance; in contrast, they now refuse to release funds for a project 
until it has already begun, leading to long stalls when the Pakistani government does not have the 
money.252  However, in contrast to Pakistan, China has relatively less to lose on the 
macroeconomic scale and can withstand losses of millions, as they have written off repeatedly, 
and the occasional loss of billions.253 
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 CPEC has run into problems with radical Islamic non-state actors, Balochi separatist 
movements, and opposition to the project due to distribution of the spoils.  For the Pakistani 
government, CPEC has become a project threatening the stability of their economy, causing their 
debt to balloon and become far more under Chinese control, and forcing their hand to seek yet 
another bailout by the IMF.  For the Pakistani people, CPEC looks like a boat that’s sprung a 
leak, with underperforming projects, few jobs, many cancellations, and overpriced products 
foisted upon them by China and its SOEs.  To China, CPEC still looks like a worthy investment 
but one whose likelihood of payoff is declining and portions of the project warrants 
reconsideration.  Due to these reasons, CPEC’s future has become jeopardized alongside the 
economy of Pakistan and the economic payoff to China.  However, in spite of all these aspects of 
economic partnership between Pakistan and China degrading, few geopolitical or militarily 
strategic facets of the CPEC advantageous to China have been significantly compromised by 
snags in the trade and infrastructural failures of the economic corridor. 
 4.4 – Pakistan’s Emblematic Position in both Belt and Road 
 Pakistan’s motivations towards investing in CPEC and outcomes derived from this 
partnership with China are not incidents isolated to the Pakistan situation.  In contrast, many of 
China’s investments for economic gain and strategic benefit reflect the situation in Pakistan.  
However, Pakistan’s position as a strategic location providing access to the Arabian Sea and 
Persian Gulf integrates it as a critical piece of both the SREB and the MSRI.254  Other countries, 
particularly those bordering China or providing similar access in “Economic Corridors,” are 
likely to follow models pertinent to Pakistan and SREB economies.   
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 Nepal’s geostrategic relationship with China can be viewed analogous to Pakistan’s due 
to similar geostrategic and infrastructural requirements to be economically linked with China and 
as another power China can use to counterbalance the dominance of India in the Indian Ocean 
region, with the exception of Indian Ocean access.  In 1988, Nepal’s king purchased Chinese 
arms and signed an intelligence exchange agreement with China, and in response to what it 
viewed as a threat to its security interests, India instituted a near-complete embargo on Nepal, 
limiting trade to two small passes to China.255  In partnering with China for new and robust 
infrastructural linkages across the Himalayas and Tibet, Nepal hopes to escape the possibility of 
economic coercion by India.  Nepal has previously pursued these policies of diversifying trade 
sources, as in the wake of the completion of Lhasa railway, Chinese trade with Nepal grew from 
9% of that of India in 2005 to 63% in 2012.256  Chinese investment in Nepal accelerated as Nepal 
became an early signatory to the BRI, with Chinese FDI in Nepal finally surpassing that of India 
and furthering Nepalese antagonisms toward Delhi, compounded in a 2015 fuel blockade by 
India.257  Much like Pakistan, China has underwritten a substantial number of projects regarding 
energy generation and the building of roads and highways – though energy generation in Nepal 
skews heavily towards hydropower as opposed to Pakistani coal power plants.258  Chinese 
investment in Nepal has grown as their interest in India has fallen, including labelling their 
transborder infrastructure as the Nepal-China Trans-Himalayan Multi-dimensional Connectivity 
Network and incorporating it with their BRI plans while dropping their inclusion of the 
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor.259  This signals a continued desire to increase 
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connectivity with Nepal and reflects many of the same investments that China has made with 
Pakistan, though Nepal does not have the same issues with debt than Pakistan is facing.  Both 
Nepal and Pakistan put strategic pressure on India, from one direction by allying with India’s 
historic enemy and from another direction by turning the policy of Nepal away from continuing 
ties to and reliance upon India. 
 Similarly to Pakistan, Mongolia is also a part of one of China’s economic corridors, 
namely the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor.260  Unlike Pakistan and Nepal, 
Mongolia has fallen under China’s sphere of influence for centuries and to some degree seeks to 
avoid increased dependence on Chinese FDI.261  China has accounted for over half of the FDI 
entering Mongolia, has consumed over 90% of their exports, and sent a commanding portion of 
Mongolian imports.262  This has created a perception of exploitation by China, particularly in 
reference to the past controlling economic power of China over Mongolian natural resources.263  
However, in spite of concerns about Chinese control held by the general population, Mongolia 
has pursued Chinese FDI in conjunction with BRI and CRM projects as “its future economic 
prosperity depends, in large part, on large infrastructure investments that will increase 
productivity and facilitate exports.”264  These infrastructure investments almost certainly must 
come from Chinese FDI, and Mongolia has secured concessional loans at the low 2% rate from 
China’s Export-Import Bank that Pakistan was unable to do.265  These loans are to be used for 
hydropower and highway infrastructure projects, both of which reflect Chinese investments in 
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Nepal and Pakistan.266  However, also similar to Pakistan, the hydropower project has stalled and 
the funds are being diverted to other BRI projects.267  Combining the shakiness of these CRM 
investments with Mongolia’s increase in debt and debt owed to China in Figure 10, a default 
becomes increasingly likely with substantial increases in debt in part due to Mongolia’s history 
with high debt in the first place.268  For China, Mongolia both represents an infrastructural 
investment designed to link East Asia to Russia and Europe, and a source of natural resources, 
paralleling the economic and geographical attractions of Pakistan.  Mongolia does lack 
geostrategic location that Nepal and Pakistan share. 
 Tajikistan has increased its debt in the past decade almost solely at the hands of China 
and its BRI-funded projects.269  Tajikistan sits near the center of the CCAWA which stretches 
through the Caucuses and to the Black Sea and has taken on extensive concessional and non-
concessional loans to fund infrastructure development in the popular land-based sectors of 
hydropower and transportation.270  China also pledged to pay for the gas pipeline they had 
planned to run from Iran through Central Asia, though not unlike other overland BRI 
investments, the project has been stalled.271  Prior to the BRI but in line with some of the most 
negative outcomes from Chinese investment, China consolidated domestic and geopolitical 
power in Xinjiang and Central Asia by forgiving an unknown amount of Tajikistan’s debt in 
return for agreeing to cede land to China, shifting the border to one more in line with Chinese 
strategic goals.272  Just a week later, Tajikistan leased land in the fertile southern region of the 
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country to migrant Chinese farmers, sparking worry that these two pro-China moves heralded 
China’s growing influence within domestic politics.273  More recently, Tajikistan has faced 
protests due to the trading of rights to mines to China in return for power plants and growing 
discontent with the number of Chinese migrant workers in the country.274  Tajikistan’s place in 
CCAWA parallels other nations’ places in the center of China’s economic and infrastructural 
investment goals and their developments reflect that, whereas China’s past forgiveness of debt in 
return for territorial claims fits neatly into the geostrategic and power consolidation reasons for 
investment that touch many of their investments throughout the SREB countries. 
 Kyrgyzstan faces many similar concerns to Tajikistan in the wake of CCAWA 
investments.  The Kyrgyz government has rapidly increased their debt-to-GDP ratio and 
proportion of external debt held by China.275  The two countries have committed to substantial 
investments in a chain of hydropower projects and the completion of the gas pipeline running to 
China.276  Railways, highway construction, bridges, tunnels, and internet networks providing far 
faster and more reliable paths throughout mountainous Kyrgyzstan have been of particular 
interest of Chinese investment.277  Although Kyrgyz debt has grown in the process of financing 
these projects, most of the protests against China have been fueled by Sinophobic nationalism, 
perceptions of corruption and bribery by the Chinese companies, and by opposition to free 
trade.278  Chinese expansion in Kyrgyzstan primarily began due to a shortage of goods following 
the fall of the USSR and has led to strong merchant populations in major metropolitan areas, but 
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these people have come under nationalist scrutiny and in part due to fear of becoming a Chinese 
vassal state.279  This nationalist concern has led to the largest protests to date in Central Asia, 
leading to arrests of a number of protestors.280  Lastly, as China seeks to consolidate power of the 
Han Chinese government over Xinjiang and minorities such as the Uyghurs, they have incurred 
public opprobrium from the Kyrgyz as tens of thousands of ethnically Kyrgyz people, many with 
relatives in Kyrgyzstan, have been detained in these reeducation camps.281  Similarly to Pakistan, 
Kyrgyzstan acts as a gateway to power consolidation in China’s west and as a pipeline for oil, 
receives investments in energy and infrastructure, faces a growing debt crisis, and has 
experienced protests over concerns with the construction of many BRI projects. 
 The closest analog to Pakistan may be Myanmar, which shares the distinction of sharing 
both a mountainous border with China and an outlet to the Indian Ocean.  Similar to Pakistan’s 
Karakoram Highway, the Burma road from Mandalay to Kunming has a long history of trade and 
relations with China.282  Since the 1980s, China has considered investments in improving the 
Burma road, expanding the Irrawaddy river for barge traffic, and developing ports in both 
Yunnan and on Burma’s coast to improve transit and trade in the region.283  In the most 
politically tumultuous years of Myanmar’s history, from 1989 to 2011, China was heavily 
involved in developing a corridor of infrastructure in Myanmar, including pipelines for Middle 
Eastern oil and a port, Kyaukpyu, functioning in much the same way as Gwadar is intended to.284  
Both Gwadar and Kyaukpyu act as “gateway ports” to inland China, which is far closer to these 
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Indian Ocean ports than to the major Pacific ports of Eastern China.285  Although China had been 
developing this Myanmar corridor for decades prior to the announcement of the BRI, they 
rebranded the effort the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar corridor in 2013 to embrace a greater 
degree of multilateralism and provide access to South Asian markets like Kolkata and Dhaka.286  
However, more recent developments have dropped the BCIM from the projects under the BRI in 
favor of a more robust bilateral relationship with Myanmar, renegotiating the port development 
of Kyaukpyu.287  This renewed focus on Myanmar allows China to increase their oil imports 
from the petroleum-exporting Myanmar, including the construction of a gas pipeline to Kunming 
and further avoid transiting the Strait of Malacca.288 
 Chinese investment and misbehavior of Chinese companies has also, similarly to 
Pakistan, turned some Burmese politicians and the public against certain projects.289  In part, 
CPEC has grown in importance at the expense of Myanmar’s past extremely close relationship 
with China.  After 2011, the Burmese government has shifted away from China due to partial 
democratization and ties with the western world, resulting in a developing “China-unfriendly 
investment environment.”290  This developed into concerns with the Burmese government and 
shifted more focus to Pakistan, though Myanmar has not seen a severe decrease in aid.  
Politically, Myanmar has assuaged some of these concerns by being the only ASEAN nation to 
not contest Chinese claims with the South China Sea, similar to Pakistan’s balancing of anti-
Chinese influence and Chinese investment.291  Myanmar’s infrastructure investment also 
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represents some sentiments similar to Pakistan’s regarding Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan, 
using Chinese development and infrastructure projects as ways to consolidate their domestic 
state power over turbulent and minority regions.292  Both countries keep with China’s 
infrastructural investment projects seeking implicitly to remake diverse and conflicting places in 
the mold of the majority and central government, reflecting their personal experience with the 
Han Chinese dominated state.293  This extension of Chinese desires and state power extends 
more strongly onto the Kachin people of Myanmar, who are also represented as a minority on the 
Chinese side of the border, similar to how China exerted control over Nepali Tibetans via 
investment in Nepal.294   
 Although Myanmar does not yet have an unsustainable debt burden, a very large portion 
of their debt is held by China, most of which was lent during the period that Myanmar was 
subjected to sanctions from the West.295  Before 2011, when Myanmar began to open up and 
sanctions from the West were loosened, 97% of the country’s foreign debt was held by China.296  
Many of the projects funded in the Myanmar corridor export supermajorities of the benefits, like 
electricity from hydropower dams, back to China, minimizing the positive effect the projects 
actually have on the host country and accumulate debt for little reason.297  Similar to Pakistan, 
Myanmar suffers from very high interest rates from Chinese loans, and has since decided to 
preemptively renegotiate Chinese agreements, including the Kyaukpyu port deal, as they have 
learned from the debt failures of the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia.298  Myanmar, like 
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Pakistan, represents a possible Chinese ally with routes to inland China and checks on both 
overland and overseas Indian power, has similar geostrategic value, and suffers similar protests, 
dissent, and a growing debt crisis.   
 Each of these countries parallels Pakistan’s position in more ways than one, usually based 
in consolidating Chinese power at home, projecting power in different regions, or providing 
overland pathways as the crux of uniting their overland belt and maritime silk road initiatives.  
Each of these countries has had a large amount of inland infrastructure investment in hydropower 
and transportation networks, and each of these countries has had some degree of backlash to 
Chinese power, though not necessarily enough to cause total political upheaval of the status quo.  
Pakistan’s CPEC is the current focal point of the BRI as the total investment to Pakistan has far 
surpassed all other land-based host countries, but similar motivations and outcome run through 
many investment programs throughout central, south, and southeast Asia.  However, as 
important as Pakistan is to the SREB, while it does participate in the MSRI, other countries more 
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Chapter 5 – Sri Lanka: A Case Study 
 
 5.1 – A History of Sri Lankan Alignment 
In contrast to the Pakistani case, Sri Lanka has not been a traditional adversary of its 
neighbor nor has it been a jewel of an economic or military prize to be won in a game of 
alliances.  Instead, Sri Lanka has charted its own path away from major powers since 
independence in 1948, joining the Non-Aligned Movement and initially with the regional power 
of India.299  Neither the United States nor the USSR invested much time and effort in attempting 
to sway Sri Lanka to their cause in the 1950s, though Sri Lanka did quickly establish a profitable 
trading relationship with China.300  However, due to issues arising from China’s treatment of 
Buddhist Tibetans, Indian asylum for the Dalai Lama, and the Sino-Indian War of 1962, relations 
with China cooled in part to avoid concerning India.301 
Sri Lanka showed remarkable interest in solidarity with other developing nations, 
particularly those associated with the Non-Aligned Movement, throughout much of their early 
history, avoiding outright alliance with the USSR, the USA, and China.302 They have been at the 
forefront of establishing talks regarding South Asian regionalism and attempting to cool some of 
the military tensions between Pakistan and India via other sectors where cooperation may be 
more useful.303  Throughout the 1980s, Sri Lanka garnered support for South Asian regionalism 
from both the USA and China, culminating in the creation of the South Asian Association for 
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Regional Cooperation (SAARC).304  In part due to Sri Lanka’s desire to diversify their trade 
partners and get out from the overwhelming presence of India – which comprises roughly 75% 
of the population, area, and GDP of the SAARC countries – and considering the extremely 
adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan, SAARC’s two most powerful countries, 
SAARC didn’t meet the wants and needs of Sri Lankan regionalism goals.305  For this reason, Sri 
Lanka also pursued membership in ASEAN, but this too had issues as, in spite of many ASEAN 
countries’ non-alignment with major international powers, ASEAN as an organization had a 
strong aversion to orientation towards China in the 1980s.306  Sri Lanka, as relations with India 
were rocky in the 1980s, needed strong trading partners other than their major neighbor, and 
provoking China by joining an ostensibly anti-Chinese organization would have jeopardized one 
of their closest non-Indian trade partners.307 
India-Sri Lanka relations have waxed and waned throughout their years of independence, 
and Sri Lanka could best be labelled as a reliable “partner” of India, if not a reliable ally.  Sri 
Lanka has been heavily reliant upon Indian imports and upon India as an export market for their 
entire history, even through times of military and political conflict.308  Sri Lanka, in part staving 
off regional maritime hegemony of its neighbor, has sought to leverage its natural ports and 
location on the Indian Ocean “strategic highway” by offering military usage to international 
powers such as the United States when relations with India are poor.309  In particular, the 
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bilateral relationship soured during the 1980s and the civil war years when bombings from the 
separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) backed by the government of a state in India 
plagued Sri Lanka, and Indian troops entered the island to help in 1983.310  Strategic divergence 
between the two nations increased during these years, but reformed in the 1990s as both nations 
became closer after the LTTE assassinated an Indian Prime Minister, essentially cutting off all 
Indian support for the LTTE, and as India globalized in the 1990s.311   
Sri Lanka, in the midst of development and increasing trade, continued to be plagued by a 
robust civil war until 2008.  During the 2000s civil war era and coinciding with an American 
crackdown on terrorism, the Sri Lankan Wickremesinghe administration pursued a closer 
political relationship with the United States and a closer economic relationship with all parties 
interested in trade.312  As China embraced a more export-oriented system, their exports to Sri 
Lanka began to steadily rise, particularly in comparison to the stagnant yet substantial trade 
relationship with India.313  Wickremesinghe and his pro-US foreign policy was voted out of 
office in 2005 as the civil war winded to a close, and his successor Rajapaksa’s administration 
became more inclined towards Chinese investment and influence within the country.314  This 
influx of Chinese money has incurred Indian suspicion of “disloyalty” by Sri Lanka and 
encouraged greater competition between China and India for Sri Lankan resources or 
infrastructural positioning.315 A variety of military ties between China and Sri Lanka including 
willingly providing submarine docking berths to turning over the lease of Hambantota port have 
led India and other foreign observers to express concern about the growing China-Sri Lanka 
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relationship.316  With Sri Lanka in particular, “China has worked on a long process changing 
name tags, technology, diplomacy, [and how they use] economic clout generated during recent 
times” to reach their targets.317  This shift toward alliance with China by the Rajapaksa 
administration has done damage to Sri Lankan relations with other global powers, but this 
culmination of the instance of Chinese power in Sri Lanka is not unprecedented.  China has built 
up a relationship with Sri Lanka since independence and capitalized on this moment to expand 
the relationship, much the same way that they did with Pakistan. 
 5.2 – How and Why has China invested in Sri Lanka? 
 Sri Lanka has been widely regarded as being in a strategic position in the Indian Ocean 
by high level officials in the Indian government and by other major foreign powers.318  Sri Lanka 
has a variety of deep-water ports and strategic locations for trade in the Indian Ocean which 
make it a desirable place for military and civilian ports for countries looking to expand their 
political and economic influence.  In part for these reasons, China has invested more in Sri Lanka 
than any other country in South Asia.  Consider Figure 11.  In this map, China has invested 
relatively more in the western and southern parts of the country than in the Tamil-populated 
north and east.  Additionally, Chinese investments skew far closer to the coast than inland, 
particularly concentrating around the capital, Colombo, and in the southern province of 
Hambantota.  Outside of this southern and western region, there are relatively fewer projects and 
far fewer large- or medium-sized projects, usually being some small funding for a road that is 
recorded in a variety of different locations. 
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FIGURE 11 
 
 Some scholars claim that “there is no denying that economic interests, in the main, are 
currently driving Sri Lanka’s ties with China,” though without providing particular evidence for 
these claims.319  The claim that economic interests drive Chinese investment in the BRI were not 
supported by the panel data regressions in Section 3.2, but this map does provide some evidence 
that economic interest may play more of a role at a subnational level in Sri Lanka.  Firstly, 
investment skews away from the Tamil regions that were prone to more violence in the civil war.  
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Secondly, it skews toward relatively high-population density areas, where there is a greater 
market for investment projects.  However, rather than investing in building up domestic 
infrastructure throughout underserved regions, power plants, and in diversifying Sri Lanka’s 
economy, Xi Jinping announced the buildup of an entirely new complex in the mold of Dubai or 
Hong Kong to be a primary node of the MSRI.320 
 In some contrast to Pakistan, Chinese investment in Sri Lanka took off in 2005 following 
the election of Rajapaksa, whose economic and infrastructural goals were not dissimilar from 
China’s own.321  Both Rajapaksa and eventually Xi Jinping saw Sri Lanka as a strategic midway 
point between the hyperdeveloped cities and trade hubs of Singapore and Dubai, leading to 
China dumping billions into developing an economic and cultural hub in Colombo and a military 
port and airport in Hambantota.322  Hypothesis 6 strongly refuted the idea that each country had 
relatively similar amounts per investment project, primarily due to Sri Lanka’s overwhelming 
primacy in the amount received in investments from China.  This regression indicated that for 
China’s megaprojects in Hambantota and Port City, the economic hub under development in 
Colombo, alongside their investments throughout the rest of the country, China cares far more 
about investing in Sri Lanka as a strategic partner and ally than anywhere else in South Asia at a 
per project level.  Even when comparing total commitments, Sri Lanka is only comparable to 
Pakistan, whose GDP is nearly 4 times that of Sri Lanka’s and population is 10 times Sri 
Lanka’s.  There is an overwhelming non-profit-maximizing investment strategy by China in Sri 
Lanka, primarily due to Rajapaksa’s openly pro-Chinese investment administration. 
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 The evidence against Chinese investment in Sri Lanka being economically oriented 
provides greater credence to the theory that the MSRI is significantly more politically motivated 
than the SREB.  While there are similar security concerns with the SREB regarding radical 
Islamist organizations in Pakistan and Central Asia, China is not building military bases in any of 
those countries, whereas China has announced 3 naval ports along the MSRI, including Jiwani, 
Hambantota, and Obock.  The SREB also has far more investment in domestic energy and 
internet infrastructure than Sri Lanka has had, with infrastructure investment in Sri Lanka limited 
to port development and major highways that expressly connect airports with ports, Chinese 
projects, and major cities rather than investing in underserved regions like the SREB has 
occasionally done.  Some scholars claim that the presence of Gwadar and Port City provide 
evidence that Chinese investment is economic rather than geopolitical in nature, and they may be 
to some degree correct.323  However, the thesis argues that investment in Gwadar and Port City is 
at the very least geo-economic if not geopolitical; China’s desire for a major economic hub in Sri 
Lanka is contingent upon the proximity to India and its path along the north Indian Ocean trade 
route, as evidenced by the proximity analyses in hypothesis 5.324 
 5.3 – Outcomes of Chinese Investment in Sri Lanka 
 There has been significant backlash to Chinese investment and a burgeoning military 
relationship with Sri Lanka both domestically and in neighboring countries.  Long-held 
understandings of Sri Lankan neutrality in matters of foreign military power have been broken 
by events such as the docking of Chinese nuclear submarines in Sri Lankan ports, especially 
given that they docked in civilian berths.325  India feels threatened by some of China’s expansion 
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in the MSRI, giving credence to the “String of Pearls” theory popular with Indian national and 
maritime security scholars.326  Consider Figure 12.327 
FIGURE 12
 
 The “String of Pearls” theory refers to an idea of Chinese encirclement of India and 
Indian military capabilities using a “string” of different ports throughout the Indian Ocean, 
ranging from Kyaukpyu to Chittagong to Hambantota to the Maldives to Gwadar to Djibouti, to 
East Africa, and even the Seychelles.  To combat perceived strategic threats due to encirclement, 
India has started engaging in strategic maritime investments of its own.  In response to perceived 
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Chinese investment in Sri Lanka, India unveiled plans to develop maritime infrastructure and a 
petroleum hub on the northeast coast of Sri Lanka at the port of Trincomalee.328  Similar 
investments have been made by Indian firms in Sittwe, Myanmar, to counter Kyaukpyu, and 
Chabahar, Iran, which is very close to Gwadar.329  These investments in India’s own chain of 
Indian Ocean ports doesn’t quite match the naval power or far-reaching capabilities of China, but 
allows there to be an Indian alternative to China for any interested international partners, though 
not necessarily with as robust funding. 
 India has also taken the step of helping to orchestrate the defeat of Rajapaksa in the 2015 
Sri Lankan presidential election, where he was running again on his pro-China platform.330  
Rajapaksa had issues as a candidate beyond just Indian machinations to instill a more pro-India 
ruler of their island neighbor.  His vanity projects funded by China resulted in $5 billion in loans 
at moderately high interest rates that were very costly for the Sri Lankan treasury.331  The rapid 
construction of the Hambantota port and projects around Colombo, including the forthcoming 
Port City, additionally fueled concerns of corruption and environmental degradation alongside 
the obvious result that Hambantota port was not producing any economic benefit.332  In the end, 
Rajapaksa lost re-election to Sirisena, who ran on a pro-India platform, but not a year after 
Sirisena’s win, he began indicating he was becoming more pro-China.333  Sirisena reneged on the 
promise to allow no further Chinese submarine dockings and reopened investment into 
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Hambantota, undermining much of what India had been trying to do with reorienting Sri Lankan 
foreign policy.334 
 This political tug-of-war between pro-Indian and pro-Chinese support in the Prime 
Ministry and the Presidency of Sri Lanka came to a head in late 2018.  Sirisena claimed, without 
evidence, that the Indian military intelligence agency was plotting his assassination and 
extralegally dismissed the sitting Prime Minister, who happened to be the pro-US and pro-India 
Wickremesinghe, and replaced him with pro-China Rajapaksa.335  Sri Lanka’s debts to China, 
which in part led to the upset that brought Sirisena to power, proved too unwieldy for Sirisena to 
manage, and he lost public support and confidence to manage the debt issues, and was even 
forced to hand over Hambantota port to China for a 99-year lease to mitigate debt issues.336  
Subsequently, he made a “if you can’t beat [China], then join [China]” decision to bring back 
Rajapaksa, who was immediately congratulated by Xi Jinping.337 
 Sirisena’s tale exhibits the success of Chinese debt trap diplomacy – in spite of his 
predecessor’s unilateral motions to take on unsustainable amounts of debt for unpopular projects, 
Sirisena was unable to raise enough capital to get Sri Lanka out of the hole that Rajapaksa 
dug.338  “Even though the Sirisena government initially promised to re-evaluate Chinese 
investment, it was unable to because India and the United States were unable to provide an 
equivalent amount of money for its projects — or to get it out of Chinese debt,” resulting in an 
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unsustainable political situation where Sirisena was losing support from those who elected him 
and saw appeals to China as the only option, thus returning Rajapaksa to a position of power.339 
 Hambantota port is the crowning pearl of Chinese investment in South Asia – something they 
were building for majority Sri Lankan control, but now is firmly entrenched in their hands.  For this 
reason and that Hambantota was not being organized as a major economic port, it may be more analogous 
to Jiwani in Pakistan than Gwadar.  The Port City near Colombo, with marketing designed to mimic high-
tech metropolises in the Indo-Pacific, bears far more resemblance to the multifaceted investment in 
Gwadar, bringing trade and foreign investment to Sri Lanka in the same way Gwadar does to Baluchistan.  
With both Gwadar and Port City, China additionally has developed nearby secondary ports with more 
ambiguous goals and far less economic or development marketing, namely Jiwani and Hambantota.  The 
MSRI’s course through Sri Lanka parallels the Chinese investment schema in western Pakistan, but 
unlike the benefits Pakistan receives from the SREB and CPEC that are dispersed throughout the country 
in providing paths from Xinjiang to the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka only has the maritime benefits to offer.  
In pursuit of these maritime geopolitical benefits, Sri Lankan domestic politics have been upended and 
suffered far more than Pakistan and other SREB nations. 
 5.4 – Sri Lanka’s Archetypal Position in the Maritime Silk Road 
 Much like Pakistan represents a set of issues very common with countries in the SREB 
and experiences some of the effects of a MSRI country due to its strategic position, Sri Lanka 
represents a set of issues recurring in countries that primarily represent maritime strategic 
interest for China.  All of the countries examined in this section border the Indian Ocean, but 
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stress from Chinese investment, a variety of debt issues, and often had their heads of state engage 
in dubiously legal policies and reforms to their personal or to China’s benefit – often both. 
 Nearest geographically and culturally to Sri Lanka is the Maldives, an island archipelago 
off the southwest coast of the Indian subcontinent.  Similar to the Rajapaksa administration, The 
Maldives has experienced a large degree of Chinese investment and alignment under the pro-
China 2013-2018 Abdulla Yameen administration.340  Investment projects with the BRI 
paralleled Sri Lanka’s Port City, but also required a constitutional change to allow non-
Maldivians to own land which led to acquisition of a large amount of land by China to construct 
the “Maldivian Dubai” at great issuance of debt to the Maldives.341  Other costly projects for 
which the Maldives has taken on debt include the construction of smaller ports and airports on 
various atolls and pricey resorts catering to the growing number of Chinese tourists.342  As 
Yameen’s administration wore on, he became more autocratic and repressed the pro-Indian 
dissent, quite similar to Rajapaksa’s duration in power in Sri Lanka.  However, India became 
concerned enough about possible Chinese military control of shipping routes through Maldivian 
waters as more and more Chinese naval ships were docking in Maldivian ports, resulting in the 
Indian government lobbying the Maldives for neutrality and positioning the Indian military in a 
position of threat to the Maldives.343  To be sure, there are valid reasons for The Maldives to 
undertake a massive investment program – they are likely the most vulnerable country in the 
world to climate change due to rising sea levels and a high point of 6 feet.  Part of China’s 
investment in The Maldives has been for their National Sustainable Development Strategy, but 
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the most prominent projects have been purely infrastructural.344  Due to vulnerability to 
exogenous shocks and a very high debt-to-GDP ratio, the Maldives is considered at very high 
risk for debt default by the IMF and the World Bank.345  Just from 2014 to 2016, China went 
from owning 25% of the Maldives’ debt to 70% of the debt and vastly increasing the risk of 
default of a nation already prone to financial instability.346  These concessional loans were 
additionally accompanied by ever-faster increases in exports from China to the Maldives.347 
 However, the Maldives domestic political situation suffered turmoil similar to Sri Lanka.  
President Yameen ordered the arrest of political rivals, almost half of the supreme court, and 
declared a state of emergency in February 2018, representing a similar issue as Sirisena’s 
dismissal of Wickremesinghe.348  However, in response to Yameen’s strongman tactics, all 
opposing political parties united in opposition, including former allies and past presidents of his 
same party – including his dictatorial half-brother.349  For the remainder of Yameen’s term, he 
was an ineffectual president hampered by anti-Chinese and pro-Indian opposition from other 
parties and from within his own, defeated by a coalition candidate in later 2018.350  Not unlike 
Sirisena’s win in 2015 following Rajapaksa’s taking on of unpopular debt and Chinese projects, 
India also helped to sway public opinion in the Maldives to vote Yameen out of power, 
providing another electoral setback to major Chinese MSRI projects.351 
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 Djibouti also represents a unique case on the MSRI.  Although Djibouti’s domestic 
politics have remained more stable than the Maldives or Sri Lanka, this is primarily due to the 
culture of African leaders maintaining monopolies on political power, winning re-election by 
extremely wide margins compared to countries in South Asia.352  Djibouti’s president since 
1999, Ismail Omar Guellah, has been increasingly hostile to western capital and has come to rely 
more heavily on two sources of income: foreign military bases and Djibouti’s strategic port at the 
Bab-el-Mandeb.353  China, in recent years, has invested in both, adding a naval base at Obock to 
Djibouti’s collection and investing in port infrastructure, railroads, airports, an oil terminal, water 
pipelines, and a toll road, the sum of these projects being equivalent to three-quarters of 
Djibouti’s GDP.354  Since 2015, Djibouti’s public debt has increased from 50% to 85% of GDP, 
the highest of any low income country, prompting the IMF to express significant concern and 
level cautionary statements in Guellah’s direction, though this hasn’t slowed the taking on of 
high-risk loans.355  However, Guellah counters with the IMF’s refusal to offer loans for 
infrastructure and human capital projects, leaving him no choice but to embrace the Chinese 
model of investment for his projects with the MSRI.356  The leaders and elites of Djibouti, in 
contrast to Sri Lanka and the Maldives, do not believe in the parallels between Obock and 
Hambantota that western investors and governments worry about.357  Even though Djibouti 
stripped the port rights of the Doraleh Container Terminal from the Dubai-based DP World to 
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give them over to the China Merchants Port Holdings (CMPH), the company that repossessed 
Hambantota Port, Djibouti sees greater traffic and trade under CMPH and believes that will 
repay Chinese loans in a way that weak trade in Sri Lanka did not.358  Although the international 
community is near certain that the issues Sri Lanka and the Maldives have faced today threaten 
Djibouti, Guellah and other Djiboutian leaders disagree, and the public of Djibouti has not had 
the same backlash to Chinese investment that Lankans and Maldivians have. 
 Cambodia, similarly to Djibouti, has not had the history of competitive elections of South 
Asian countries, and has a Prime Minister, Hun Sen, who has served as head of state since 
1985.359  Sen’s party has moved more towards China in the years following the 2013, in which 
his party came very close to losing.360  This move towards China was accompanied by a swing 
towards authoritarianism, the closure of democratic institutions, and the banning of the 
opposition political party, and rapidly decreasing support from western powers.361  Since Sen 
proactively sought Chinese support to consolidate power in 2013, his government has seen rapid 
increases in public debt and the proportion of debt held by China, though is not at risk of default 
due to past forgiveness of debt by China and relatively low levels of debt.362  However, this 
friendly relationship with China and their past forgiveness of Cambodian debt comes with ties, 
including, as ASEAN chair in 2012, blocking a joint communiqué mentioning the South China 
Sea disputes and preventing ASEAN from unilaterally condemning Chinese territorial claims in 
the same dispute in 2017.363  Cambodia’s eschewing of ASEAN’s unified positions on Chinese 
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claims in the South China Sea undermines the strength of the usually amiable regional 
organization and, along with distancing themselves from the United States and any display of 
support for Taiwan, further ties them to China.364   
Cambodia has also militarily tied themselves to China, hosting joint naval exercises and 
taking billions in military aid for tanks, and has rejected India’s proposition for ASEAN 
countries to join the “New India.”365  This “New India” proposal has attracted few ASEAN 
nations as it ties them to the slow moving bureaucracy of India and signals hesitancy with 
Chinese policy, both of which would be damning for a Cambodian economy with strong demand 
for infrastructure and port investments currently supplied by China.366  China’s investment thus 
far has centered around building thousands of miles of new highways, renovating railroads, and 
port development, though these benefits have caused some unease and disgruntlement among the 
local populations.367  Cambodian leaders, for reasons of consolidation of power and for a steady 
supply of loans from an economic partner like China, feel solid in their relationship with China 
and believe their partnership to be a key boon for their economy.368  However, these same 
leaders may underestimate the degree that their citizenry is displeased with Chinese investment, 
though this is mitigated by their landslide election win in 2018 buoyed by Chinese money.369  
From past experiences with Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Malaysia, China wants to preserve 
administrations in countries that will continue their strong bilateral relationships and investment 
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patterns, thus motivating Chinese investment to keep people like Hun Sen in power.370  Chinese 
investment in Cambodia may not threaten a debt crisis the same way it does in Sri Lanka, but it 
does still destabilize government, pit pro-Chinese camps against other parties, and undermine 
democratic institutions.371 
Malaysia, seeing the effect of Chinese investment in Sri Lanka and combating their own 
corruption, brought a very old past Prime Minister back to oust the pro-China incumbent in an 
election and has since significantly scaled back their acceptance of Chinese investment projects 
while changing their rhetoric towards China.372  Under the pro-Chinese investment 
administration of Najib Razak, Malaysia took tens of billions of dollars in investment loans from 
China that they would have difficulty paying back.373  Mahathir Mohamed’s campaign for the 
Prime Ministry rested heavily upon casting the debt concern of Chinese BRI projects, coming 
right on the heels of China’s Hambantota repossession, as critical national security threats.374  
These arguments were effective as many of the investments China made into Malaysian 
infrastructure was in expansions and equity stakes of Malaysian ports.375  He won the election 
and cancelled over $20 billion in Chinese investment projects and committed to renegotiating 
others, keeping to his promise and receiving a public mandate for a more cautious approach to 
future dealings with China.376  Mohamed’s campaign frequently criticized the corruption of 
Razak’s government, particularly the connections that Razak’s own bank accounts had with 
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Chinese investment projects.377  In office, Mohamed has continued to detail the degree of 
inflation in the costs of Chinese projects, the failure of these projects to deliver, and calmly 
continued to criticize China’s economic policy.378  Similarly, Mohamed has also taken positions 
out of line with those of China, particularly with respect to the Uyghur conflict.  Under his 
direction, Malaysia sent several Uyghur men who had escaped China and a Thai prison to 
Turkey rather than back to China, under the claim that the Uyghurs were Turkish citizens, as the 
refugee Uyghurs had claimed.379  Even though China criticized this decision, they have not 
denounced Mohamed or even strongly rebuked his presidency, common moves for China when 
their sovereignty is challenged, as they have seen how a candidate can successfully run against 
their investment programs, even in a country with a long history and alliance with China.380  
Mohamed sparks some concerns in China about the efficacy of inflated loans and high-risk 
foreign policy as he has challenged Chinese investment while maintaining public support for an 
anti-China stance.381 
 Even with countries that are not experiencing the same kind of political turmoil of Sri 
Lanka and the Maldives, or the dictatorships of Djibouti and Cambodia, the fear of takeover of 
assets looms large.  In both Kenya and Tanzania, fears of losing Kenya’s stake in Mombasa due 
to rumors of its use as collateral, and concerns about the lack of transparency and use affiliated 
with Chinese investment in the Tanzanian Bagamoyo Port, have led to public outcry and 
 
377 Banyan, "The perils of China’s ‘debt-trap diplomacy,’" The Economist, September 6, 2018, 
https://www.economist.com/asia/2018/09/06/the-perils-of-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy. 
378 Ibid. 
379 Joseph Sipalan, "Defying China: Malaysia's Mahathir Says Uyghurs Released Because They Did Nothing 
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governmental holds on these projects.382  Sri Lanka’s experience with Hambantota has 
reverberated around the MSRI community as some countries now seek to minimize their 
exposure to debt and as political parties succeed or fail when running on pro- or anti-Chinese 
platforms.  Sri Lanka’s experience also encouraged some countries to cut their losses and get 
fully on the Chinese bandwagon if they are unable to pay off their debt – as Sirisena discovered 
and changed his pro-India stance.  However, the domestic political struggles and geostrategic 
locations of maritime investments by China, particularly those throughout the Indian Ocean 
region, directly parallel the motivations and results shared by the investments in Sri Lanka, and 
as such Sri Lanka stands out as the emblematic position of Chinese investment on the Maritime 
Silk Road.   
 
382 Kawira Mutisya, "Kenya Could Lose Its Mombasa Port to China Over SGR Debt,” The Exchange, December 19, 
2018, https://advance-lexis-com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5V0X-
70V1-DY15-S34D-00000-00&context=1516831. 
     Dipanjan R. Chaudhury, "Tanzania President terms China's BRI port project exploitative," India Times, July 6, 
2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/tanzania-president-terms-bri-port-
project-exploitative/articleshow/70109612.cms?from=mdr. 
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In summary of the case studies of Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and the other countries’ political outcomes affiliated with Chinese investment, Table 2 
has been provided. 
TABLE 2 
 Key SREB MSRI Both 
Democratic Checks on Power       
Leans Autocracy       
Host 















Initiated CPEC, but cancelled 
many projects outside of Punjab 
Impeached and removed due 
to corruption, and Shehbaz 
stood as candidate in 2018 
election 







Investment          
2018-Present 
Moderate 
Protested CPEC in 2014, Won 
election in part on anti-Chinese 
sentiment 
Defaulted on debt and took 
7th bailout from IMF, leading 
to austerity measures and 











aggressively sought Chinese 
loans for projects, particularly 
in his home state of Hambantota 
Mahinda's younger brother 
Gotabaya Rajapaksa elected 













Mahinda Rajapaksa appointed 
as PM for a couple weeks by 
Sirisena in constitutional crisis 
in 2018 
Gotabaya Rajapaksa appoints 
Mahinda as PM after victory 














Appointed as PM by Sirisena in 
2015.  Dismissed for a couple 
weeks in 2018 when Sirisena 
became pro-China 
Re-appointed to Prime 
Ministry by the courts 
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Sri Lanka 
Maithripala 
Sirisena President 2015-19 
2015-2018 Anti-
China and Pro-




Elected with Indian support.  
Changed tune in 2018 to court 
China, dismissed 
Wickremesinghe as PM, and 
claimed India was trying to 
assassinate him without 
evidence. 
Couldn't deal with Mahinda 
Rajapaksa's debt & led to 
giving the Chinese total 
control over Hambantota.  
Couldn't get good loans from 
Western world, turned back to 
China & brought Rajapaksa 











First democratic president in 
2008, Forced out of office in a 
coup in 2012 
During the Nasheed years, 
harsh anti-China critic and 





Yameen President 2013-18 
Pro-Chinese 
Investment 
Doubled China-held debt, 
allowed docking of Chinese 
naval ships, and built Chinese 
tourist resorts 
Brother of the head of the pre-
Nasheed dictatorship and had 
opposition leaders and checks 









and the West 
Backed by funding from Indian 
intelligence agencies, won an 
upset victory over Abdullah 
Yameen 
Supported by Yameen's 
dictator half-brother who 
switched support in 2018, 
brought Nasheed to a position 
of power. 





Accepted billions in Chinese 
loans for projects, millions of 
which ended up in his own bank 
account 
Pursued rivals in 2nd, more 
Pro-China term, on sedition 
charges, and allowed ethnic 















Ran on an anti-Chinese 
platform of nationalist fears of 
foreign takeover and handily 
beat Razak 
Cancelled billions of dollars 
of Chinese projects in spite 
approving of Chinese 
investment during his first 
stint as PM 









all military bases 
and Pro-Chinese 
investment 
Since taking office, Djibouti's 
debt has climbed to 90% China-
held and with GDP greater than 
100% debt 
Little opposition due to 
dictatorship 









Backed Chinese SCS claims as 
ASEAN chair as China now 
holds ever larger amounts and 
percentages of debt 
Little effective opposition due 
to dictatorship 
Nepal 












ties with India 
Prime ministers court Chinese 
investment project for 
infrastructure and energy 
development but also must 
avoid provoking India, their 
main outlet to the world.  
Nepal's Communist parties also 
exert slightly stronger 
influence. 
Little opposition from voting 
Nepalis and ruling Bahun, 
Chhetri, and Newar classes 
who are tired of an Indian 
chokehold.  Immigrant 
Tibetans are unhappy but do 
not have voting power, and 
peoples near the Chinese 








Has not issued statements 
rebuking Chinese investment or 
of concern about Kyrgyzstan's 
growing debt levels 
Protests in Kyrgyzstan 
regarding Chinese workers 
and detention of Uyghurs and 









to gain more 
revenue to offset 
debt 
Solicits loans in many 
infrastructure and development 
projects but also levies high and 
unexpected taxes 
Little opposition due to 
dictatorship.  Gave China land 
settling border dispute and 
leased land to Chinese 
farmers in return for debt 
forgiveness in 2011. 
Myanmar 













Chinese investment underwent 
a moderate resurgence 
compared to Thein Sein's term 
as President 
State Counsellor position 
established because 
constitution forbids Aung San 
Suu Kyi from holding other 
high offices 
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Chinese investment rapidly 
accelerated during his Prime 
Ministership 
Appointed by the ruling 
military junta 





Cancelled a major hydroelectric 
dam due to public outcry and 
scaled back other investment 
projects and joined ASEAN 
Oversaw democratic reforms 
away from junta era 
Mongolia 
Khaltmaagiin 





knows it is 
necessary for his 
nation's 
economy 
Campaigned on national 
security and economic security 
with suspicion of Chinese 
investment 
Has courted India and the 
United States in an attempt to 
reduce dependence on 











Accepted billions of credit from 
China while courting western 
powers and denying Chinese 
"orders" to not meet the Dalai 
Lama 
One of the founding fathers of 
Mongolian democracy, he led 
democratic reforms and 
sought investment from both 










Campaigned in 2017 on being 
highly investment friendly and 
against Battulga's resource 
nationalism 
Presidential Candidate against 
Battulga in 2017 
Tanzania John Magufuli President 
2015-
present 
Mixed ideas on 
Chinese 
investment 
Magufuli praises aid projects 
without major strings attached, 
but also has sharply criticized 
their flagship port project in 
Bagomoyo 
Scaled back Bagomoyo port 
project, calling their 
conditions exploitative and 
awkward 





Kenyatta has dismissed all 
criticism of possibility of debt 
trap diplomacy, even when 
equity of Kenya's major port is 
at stake 
Generally been very positive 
towards all Chinese projects 
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 This table organizes the effects of Chinese investment and positions held by the host 
countries’ leaders who agreed or disagreed with investment projects.  Firstly, we notice that 
autocratic regimes are more consistent in acceptance of Chinese aid and investment with 
minimal domestic blowback.  Out of the autocratic regimes, only Tajikistan has expressed any 
reservations about Chinese investment projects, though minimally, and continued to accept many 
large loans for BRI projects.  Purely SREB democracies all border China, and only 1/3 of them, 
namely being solely Mongolia, has had election outcomes largely dependent upon the position of 
China in the domestic economy.  In contrast, a far greater proportion (6/7) of MSRI and both 
MSRI & SREB democracies have experienced electoral turmoil due to debates regarding 
Chinese investment, with only Kenya remaining pro-Chinese investment.  When autocratic 
regimes are accounted for, leaving countries with constituencies that demand greater or lesser 
amounts of Chinese aid & investment, the MSRI countries have had greater debate on the 
implications regarding sovereignty and concerns with economic security, even when SREB 
countries have similar or greater levels of debt & likelihood of default.  This provides another 
data point distinguishing the differences in outcomes in the SREB & MSRI routes and reinforces 
that while Pakistan & Myanmar have had their investment strategies fall more along the SREB 
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
 
 6.1 – Quantitative and Qualitative Results 
In the panel data regressions, we found that increases in population, GDP, and GDP per 
capita were not correlated with increases in total Chinese aid and investment nor the number of 
investment projects in a country in a given year.  These implied that Chinese investment was not 
profit-oriented, as increases in population and GDP are correlated with profit-seeking investment 
as they are variables used to measure the size of the market, nor was China investing in more 
developed areas to capitalize on middle classes with more disposable income.  However, we also 
saw that alignment with China or disalignment with the United States at the UNGA was not a 
motivator of investment projects in the host country, with data even going as far as to 
significantly state that an increase in voting alignment with the United States was correlated with 
Chinese aid.  Figure 7 helped refute this result as there is not meaningful variation between 
countries from year to year, as most South Asian countries’ voting alignment with a great power 
country increases or decreases together and renders variation unhelpful.   
However, the regression in Figure 8 found a wide variety of significant results including 
that the average project value in Sri Lanka was vastly higher than any other South Asian country, 
that the average project value in Myanmar, Nepal, and Bangladesh was statistically lower than 
other countries, and a number of significant proximity results.  These proximity results implied 
that the further an investment project was from an oilfield, the more funding it was likely to 
receive.  While this certainly provides evidence for that Chinese investment projects in South 
Asia are not oriented towards acquisition of petroleum from South Asian and Indian Ocean 
oilfields, we should be skeptical of a result implying that more money is given explicitly due to 
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being distant from oilfields.  Likely, this result is in part because many of the oilfields of South 
Asia, particularly those used as primary exports, like those of Myanmar, are offshore and thus 
significantly more likely to be distant from on-land Chinese investment projects.  Either way, 
this result firmly supports the null hypothesis of hypothesis 4.   
Secondly, the hypothesis found that being close to either China’s border or to the ocean 
was statistically significantly correlated with an increase in value of investment projects.  
Increases in value of projects closer to Chinese borders imply that China does legitimately care 
about infrastructure near its borders and in the provinces at the periphery of Chinese power, 
namely Tibet, Xinjiang, and Yunnan.  Each of these regions has only a minority of Han Chinese 
and 2 of these regions have been particularly restive and continual nuisances for China.  
Increasing the infrastructure within rural China and in the nations at China’s borders consolidates 
Chinese power by allowing for faster shipment of goods, services, and soldiers wherever they 
may need to arrive in China.  An increase in investment correlated with proximity to the Chinese 
border directly implies a focus on consolidation of the power of the Chinese government.  
Similarly, increases in investment correlated with proximity to the ocean implies China cares 
more about the coasts of a nation than the interior and population dense central regions.  Several 
theories can be considered to explain this preference.  Coasts are where the vast majority of trade 
enters and exits these nations as 90% of all shipping is done by sea, requiring ports to bring 
goods in and out of the country, possibly implying that China seeks to use these coasts for trade.  
Coasts also have natural harbors which are a kind of natural resource that China may be drawn to 
in order to use that natural harbor, which may also be for trade.  Although ports are useful for 
trade, this phenomena was qualitatively observed with places such as the Maldives, western 
Pakistan, and southern Sri Lanka – all comparatively uninhabited regions compared to other 
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parts of their country and their close neighbors.  Trade to develop the host country can be 
rejected as investment seems to only be located near the coasts as can investment to gain market 
access, thus political and strategic implications of Chinese-dominated ports in South Asia is the 
likely leftover outcome.  China has a network of ports surrounding India and connecting to 
strategic natural resource terminuses of pipelines which can project Chinese power and protect 
Chinese interests and shipping in the region.  Especially when considering the military aspect of 
Chinese ports in Jiwani and Obock, Chinese OFDI is oriented towards coasts for explicitly 
geostrategic purposes. 
The data acquired and models run in this thesis are not the zenith of sophistication nor at 
the cutting edge of regression theory.  They are simple models indicating simple results and do 
have their flaws, given the fact that alignment with US at the UNGA was correlated with an 
increase in number of investment projects in a country.  However, these results do imply a 
pattern of significant geographic political and economic investments that are non-profit-seeking, 
which is a critical conclusion in highlighting the ways in which Chinese investment in South 
Asia is oriented towards political investment. 
 6.2 – Impact on Alignment and Policy Implications 
 China’s One Belt, One Road initiative is changing alliances throughout Eurasia and 
impacting the way countries and even their administrations are viewed as pro- or anti-Chinese 
investment.  Countries previously politically close to India like Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the 
Maldives have now become political battlegrounds between pro-Indian and pro-Chinese factions, 
or simply declared they seek greater ties with China now.  Conversely, longstanding Chinese 
allies like Myanmar and Malaysia are taking a second look at whether or not a close economic 
relationship with China is the healthiest decision for their future.  Old Chinese rivals, like 
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Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, are accepting an onslaught of Chinese investment and 
ignoring past imperialist history, modern oppression of minorities in China, and accepting 
China’s demand for recognition of absolute control over their sovereign claims.  And past allies 
of the United States like Pakistan, the Philippines, and Djibouti seek out a more diverse profile of 
military allies and investors, leading them to China’s high-risk loans.  All of these changes are 
happening in the Maritime Silk Road or Inland Eurasian regions, and many of these changes are 
tied to infrastructure investments, power generation, geopolitically strategic ports, or debt. 
 As China develops new partners, are they building economic and military trust between 
these geopolitically strategic countries?  In other words, are they economic partners, allies, or 
trusted allies, who can be used as regional implementers of Chinese foreign policy?  Evidence 
from the thesis indicates no, and that China has not built a Sinitic Imperium, under the 
Katzenstein model of American Regionalism.383  In Katzenstein’s American model, America 
built an imperium of tacit control of vast swaths of the world, but consolidating strong alliances 
around trusted allies most effectively brought other countries into the USA’s economic and 
military alliance orbit.  Germany was the flagship of American development in Europe, just as 
Japan represented a bright future for US-allied developing countries in East Asia.384  However, to 
provide a metaphor for airline transportation, these alliances operate off of a “hub-and-spoke” 
model, centered on the United States as the main hub but using Germany and Japan as “focus 
countries.”385  Within the American system, there were still differences, as the US prioritized 
multilateral relationships in Europe and bilateral relationships in Asia, but both promoted the 
 
383 Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2005), 2. 
384 Ibid., 3. 
385 Victor D. Cha, "Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia," International Security 34, no. 3 
(Winter 2009): 161, doi:10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.158. 
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success of Germany and Japan under American models of development as leaders in their 
respective regions.386  One of these “focus countries” then provided a strong voice to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and was the driving force behind establishing the 
European Union, developing an economic pact alongside the military pact designed to counter 
Soviet aggression.  The other one, Japan, continued robust economic and moderate military 
relationships with South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, though had nowhere near the same 
kind of multilateral institution that Europe had.387  Both of these models allowed for group 
camaraderie and resilience and legitimate care for their neighbors, even when those neighbors 
had conquered and abused the others in the group a couple decades ago, though they were 
undoubtedly stronger in ties in Europe due to the multilateral ties.  In regions where the US did 
not establish a clear dominant partner, like support for both Israel and Saudi Arabia in the 
Middle East, the US has never held clear political control.388  Thus, networks of countries 
working together in pursuit of goals in line with US foreign policy supported the development of 
an American imperium in a way that supporting conflicting powers did not. 
 In the airline industry, the “hub-and-spoke” model is used by most major American 
carries, like American, United, and Delta.  The main alternative flight pattern toponymy is the 
“point-to-point” model, where flights are sent from city to city rather than to a hub, used by 
Southwest Airlines.  Unlike the United States, China almost exclusively uses bilateral 
relationships to develop economic and military partnerships with other countries and doesn’t 
promote their closer allies to positions of special importance.  This does not allow for the 
 
386 Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, 
Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," International Organization 56, no. 3 (2002): 581, 
doi:10.1162/002081802760199890. 
387 Ibid., 581. 
388 Katzenstein, A World of Regions, 3. 
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formation of an expansive economic or military partnership in the mold of the European Union 
or NATO.  As China does subscribe to a model of alliances and infrastructure development 
dependent on corridors, we can clearly see which model they follow.  Consider Figure 13.389 
FIGURE 13 
 
 All railroads, corridors, and pipelines planned lead back to China or to ports, rather than 
connecting other countries multilaterally or providing robust infrastructure deeper into countries.  
Whereas the American model used a major hub of the United States and smaller focus countries 
of Germany and Japan in economic and military alliances, the Chinese model does not 
congregate on any one location outside of China itself.  China has no focus country, even if they 
tout the strategic importance and most valued partnership of Pakistan.  This model could be best 
described as a point-to-point model with China starting as a start or stop point in almost every 
transaction.  The MSRI may pass through other nations, but every port that an oil tanker sailing 
 
389 Eder, "China Creates a Global Infrastructure Network.” 
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that route will stop at is partially owned by China.  The SREB may stretch to Europe, but CPEC 
and the BCIM are for providing China with another route for goods.  NELB, CRM, and 
CCAWA are all designed to provide China non-MSRI sources of energy, particularly petroleum 
and natural gas from Central Asia and Russia, but have not been funded as strongly as CPEC and 
the Myanmar part of the BCIM have as their purpose is significantly biased towards resource 
acquisition rather than geostrategic need. 
Their investment data and maps point more towards undermining multilateralism and 
international organizations, such as ASEAN, than promoting alliances between two countries 
that aren’t China.390  China similarly has clearly left certain SAARC countries out of major 
investment projects, as shown in Figure 1.  Unlike the American Marshall Plan, China’s BRI 
does not build up a region to be economically strong and resilient on its own, instead making 
each country reliant upon China.391  Using this bilateral point-to-point model, China forges 
economic partnerships but does not seem to value their relationships with foreign countries, 
instead levying very high interest rate loans on many vanity projects.  This may work with 
certain administrations and leaders, but is not as successful in a long-term model, nor a model 
with a world full of functioning democracies. 
Should China desire to maintain their model into the future, they could foster allies to 
emulate the position of Germany, building multilateralism and regionalism in a Chinese 
worldview using strong economic and military international organizations.  Japan’s position as a 
weaker focus country has become evident, as South Korea has signed a defense agreement with 
 
390 Wong, "China's Economic Statecraft Under Xi Jinping.” 
391 Minghong, "Understanding the BRI: China's Perspective," in China’s One Belt One Road, 10. 
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China and the Philippines has been swayed relatively away its pro-American position.392  China 
could seek to further fragment alliance structures like the EU and multilateralism in ASEAN, 
then offering the countries without as strong of allies a new option with a Chinese multilateral 
organization and multilateral benefits.  China’s current practice of being somewhat exploitative 
in loans and interest and holding debt over allies’ heads is unlikely to garner many friends 
leaving NATO and the EU. 
 Similarly, the United States could seek to shore up multilateral institutions and entice 
further countries to join organizations like a revitalized Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or 
another kind of pro-America multilateral trade benefit or economic or military partnership in the 
Indo-Pacific region.  America can see clear failures in developing imperium in the Middle East, 
South Asia, and Africa, and should realize that appeasing conflicts between adversarial dyads 
and forging alliances with both of them can help develop a future of American imperium.393  
Recently, there have been cracks in America’s hold on peninsular and archipelagic Pacific Asia, 
implying that American alliances need greater integration with each other or attention to their 
needs from the USA itself.  The USA could also ensure that the EU can weather threats to its 
unity from internal nationalism, Russian and other foreign efforts to sow discontent, and 
revitalize economic ties between the USA and the EU. 
 Lastly, for an Indian idea of imperium, India could continue forging ties with countries in 
opposition to Chinese investment.  India should continue development of its multilateral Japan-
India-Iran-Afghanistan port at Chabahar, Iran, competing with the CPEC-funded Gwadar.  India 
 
392 Julian Ryall, "China signs defence agreement with South Korea as US angers Seoul with demand for $5bn troop 
payment," Telegraph, November 18, 2019, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/11/18/china-signs-defence-
agreement-south-korea-us-angers-seoul-demand/. 
393 Lu, “Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Territorial Disputes,” 16. 
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could continue prioritizing investment from Japan and other interested anti-China parties over 
investment affiliated with the BRI, AIIB, or even some western powers.  India could court 
former allies and tentative current allies like the Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh for 
renewed trade agreements, investment, and military alliances, and reach out to those hesitant 
about China, namely Malaysia and Myanmar.  If other countries sour on either Chinese or 
western investment, India could step in with more modest or reasonable proposals and attempt to 
make an economic partner, possibly even providing India a golden opportunity for “economic” 
peace talks between Chinese debt-laden Pakistan.  India could also cultivate Indian naval power 
and goodwill abroad, marketing itself as the true recipient of the baton of American imperium, as 
it is the world’s largest democracy but still shares many qualities with smaller countries of the 
Global South.  Without investment in naval power and bases outside of India, it can never 
actualize latent goodwill toward India by the general public while still shedding popular opinions 
of weakness and poverty. 
 Under the model of regionalism, multilateral connections and institutions are far stronger 
than bilateral ties, providing greater evidence for the efficacy of a hub-and-spoke model of 
globalization with several trusted allies functioning as focus countries.  It could behoove the 
three major interested actors in the Indian Ocean conflict to embrace greater multilateralism for 
goals of increasing their longevity of power and legitimacy as actors who can make investments 
for more than just their own interest.  The bilateral model, and especially the point-to-point 
model currently used by China, result in greater rates of failure due to a lack of trust and long-
term planning between not only the governments of these nations, but also the citizenry. 
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 6.3 – Relation to Past and Future Literature  
 In this thesis, I used Paul and Benito’s ADO framework to provide context as to what 
past scholars have found regarding the motivations, decisions, and the outcomes of Chinese 
investment.  I examined decisions of investment and outcomes of investment using maps and 
tables to provide evidence and context for why Chinese MNEs may or may not invest in one 
place or another.  When evaluating literature regarding outcomes of Chinese investment, I used a 
case study in the Tibetan community in Nepal following Chinese investment in infrastructure in 
the region to detail effects on Chinese minority diaspora communities, and cited data regarding 
the effects of Chinese investment on UNGA and UNSC voting patterns.  I then tested a variety of 
hypotheses which, by and large, supported the claim that Chinese investment was not oriented 
towards market forces, but may be more domestically politically or geopolitically inclined.  
These hypotheses included strong correlations with proximity to the ocean and to China, strong 
negative correlation with proximity to oil, and positive and negative correlations with a variety 
of countries that, by-and-large, provided evidence for bias towards countries with which China 
has forged stronger ties.  Lastly, I used case studies in Pakistan and Sri Lanka to show how they 
represented major political changes in a variety of countries on the SREB and MSRI, 
respectively, and touched on how Pakistan could be applied to both the overland and waterborne 
transportation networks.  Examining the history of both countries’ relationships with China and 
how it has grown rapidly in recent years provided context to the Chinese investment patterns in 
these two countries, and the universalization of these effects to countries across Afro-Eurasia 
displays that concerns with events in Pakistan and Sri Lanka are not isolated incidents.  
Democratic countries have had more variability in their stance on Chinese investment, and MSRI 
countries have experienced far greater turmoil than countries more impacted by SREB 
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investment strategies, though in countries with both SREB & MSRI investment, domestic 
political outcomes reflect MSRI countries more than SREB nations. 
 My analysis and conclusion are heavily based around South Asia, which may have a 
more geopolitically motivated investment strategy than other regions that China has invested in.  
I would be interested in seeing a similar analysis of Chinese investment in Africa or Central 
Asia, focusing less on the MSRI and more on the impact of the SREB, which, from my research, 
was far less geopolitically motivated than the MSRI countries.  Secondly, I would like to see 
similar proximity investment tests run on the presence of minerals and other natural resources 
scarce in China other than just petroleum – petroleum is useful as it is the most demanded highly 
scarce natural resource bound by geography, but it also is a single natural resource when an 
investing country could be seeking many.  It may also be the case that China invests more 
strongly in natural resource seeking ways in the SREB or in Africa.  Lastly, I would like to see a 
comparison of American and European investment patterns worldwide compared to China and 
the statistical differences in their support of dictatorship, human rights abusing administrations, 
and the same geopolitical measurements that I used.  Within this same model, I would like to see 
these investment patterns contrasted with Chinese investment patterns decade by decade, 
comparing whether or not Chinese investment in the BRI today is simply a modern and scaled up 
version of past OECD geopolitical investment.  Additionally, how frequently does western aid or 
investment lead to political crises?  These are the questions that naturally arose from my research 
and my conclusions, though did not effectively fit with my topic.  In South Asia, Chinese MNEs 
and parts of the Chinese government invest in a non-profit-oriented way and tend towards 
geopolitical and domestic political motive, but do these findings hold for all regions, are they 
robust, and are they unique to Chinese investment? 
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